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TAKING MACHISMO TO COURT: THE
GENDER JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
MARTHA I. MORGAN'
1. Martha I. Morgan is Robert S. Vance Professor of Law, University of Alabama,
Box 870382, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, 35487-0382 USA; e-mail: mmorgan@law.ua.edu. As a
teacher of constitutional law, I have long been interested in exploring the role that law
can play in advancing social justice generally and women's rights, in particular. See, e.g.,
Martha I. Morgan, Founding Mothers: Women's Voices and Stories and the 1987
Nicaraguan Constitution, 70 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1990); Martha I. Morgan with M6nica Marfa
Alzate Buitrago, Constitution-Making in a Time of Cholera: Women and the 1991
Colombian Constitution, 4 YALE J. OF L. & FEMINISM 353 (1992). Four years after
observing the 1991 Colombian Constituent Assembly and surrounding events, I revisited
Colombia, with the valuable assistance of my Colombian colleague M6nica Azate, to
assess the early impact of the new constitution and the Constitutional Court it created,
focusing on its gender jurisprudence. I made a brief return trip in December 1998 to
update my research. I would like to thank Dean Kenneth Randall and the Alabama Law
School Foundation for supporting this research. I particularly want to thank Catalina
Botero, Magistrada Auxiliar, and Esteban Restrepo, Abogado Asistente, for their
assistance with my research at the Colombian Constitutional Court and Luz Estella
Nagle for her valuable comments and suggestions. Others who deserve thanks for
generously giving their time to comment on prior drafts include James Garland, Margo
Gutierrez, Harvey Kline, Alexander Springer, Norman Stein, and Adrien Wing. Special
thanks are due to my colleague Wythe Holt for his patience and care in reviewing and
commenting on numerous drafts and to Patricia Wallace for her valuable editorial
assistance. I also want to express my appreciation to Josd Cano who provided the
transcriptions of many of the interview tapes and Piedad G6mez who assisted me in
Colombia. I presented a talk based on an earlier version of this work at the Women's
Rights Committee of the Inter-American Bar Association in May 1998 in Lima, Peru. A
piece drawing on this article and on my earlier work with Mdnica Alzate on women's
rights in Colombia will be published later in 1999 by New York University Press in an
anthology edited by Adrien Wing, tentatively titled Global Critical Race Feminism.
Note that the Constitutional Court's opinions generally are cited by number and
year only, not by party names. The letter "T" before the opinion number signifies a tutela
action and the letter "C" signifies an action of unconstitutionality. "SU" indicates a
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"We cannot separate ourselves from the law. We are in a state
of law." Mara Cristina Calder6n, Director of Legal Services,
PROFAMILIA.2
"We want to make sure that people's fundamental rights do
not just stay on paper." Carlos Gaviria Dfaz, Magistrado and
former President of the Colombian Constitutional Court.!
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sentencia de unificaci6n, a tutela decision by the full Court rather than a panel of three
justices. Cases cited in this Article, given only by their number and year, have been
supplied by the Constitutional Court itself on CD-ROM. Cases are available on the
Internet at <www.fij.edu.co> (Cases on file with the Inter-American Law Review).
Translations from Spanish to English are by the author unless otherwise noted.
2. Interview with Maria Cristina Calder6n, Director of Legal Services,
PROFAMILIA, Bogota, Colombia (July 7, 1995).
3. Juanita Darling, Colombians Happy to Tell It to the Judge, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22,
1996, at A39. Magistrado(a) is the title given a member of higher courts in Colombia and
other Latin American countries. After consulting Colombians about appropriate
translations for English-speaking audiences, I have decided to use the title "Justice" when
referring to the members of the Constitutional Court in order to denote a level of status
and respect analogous to that of members of the U.S. Supreme Court. The office of
President of the Colombian Constitutional Court is held by one of the justices selected
through election by the Court's nine members. The presidency has rotated among the
justices, with Justice Eduardo Cifuentes Mufioz most recently assuming the office in
February 1999. Each justice is assisted by two magistrados(as), auxiliaries, auxiliary or
assistant magistrados, who are experienced lawyers and law professors serving in
positions similar to permanent senior law clerks, and by other young lawyers serving as
judicial assistants.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Colombia may seem an unlikely crucible for a progressive
gender jurisprudence. But Colombia is a country of extremes.4
In a country where the judicial system itself has been one of the
4. Interview with Maria Isabel Plata, Director of PROFAMILIA, BogotA, Colombia
(Dec. 15, 1998).
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targets of brutal violence, ordinary courts have been plagued by
inefficiency and delay and have been largely inaccessible to all
but the powerful elite. Machismo and conservative Catholicism
have circumscribed and marginalized women's roles and lives
within the society. Yet Colombian women's rights advocates
have been active participants in the contemporary global struggle
for gender justice. And justices of their new Constitutional Court
are using the broad positive rights regime of the 1991 Colombian
Constitution and its streamlined methods of implementation and
enforcement in a determined effort to make these rights more
than just paper guarantees for women and other traditionally
politically powerless groups. During the early years under the
new Constitution, women's rights advocates, and their foes, have
presented the country's Constitutional Court5  with cases
involving a full spectrum of contemporary gender issues-
abortion, affirmative action, domestic violence, employment
discrimination, sexual orientation, teenage pregnancy, and
women in the military-and more.6  Since issuing its first
decisions in February 1992, the Court has produced a surprising
body of gender jurisprudence that merits study both as
comparative constitutional interpretation and for what it has to
say about the role that law, in the hands of a willing judicial
body, can play in promoting social change in general and in
improving the status of women in particular.
Long seen as the "Cinderella" among the Colombian
governmental branches, the judicial branch under the new
constitution is finally moving into the public spotlight. It is
apparent that the Constitutional Court has become a leading
participant in Colombia's ongoing societal conversation about
human rights and the meaning of fundamental rights under the
new constitution. In this article, I draw from personal interviews
and observations as well as documentary sources to report on
some gender-related aspects of this conversation. To the extent
5. For an excellent comparative account of the history of the Colombian judicial
system and the new Constitutional Court by a scholar intimately acquainted with both
Colombian and U.S. systems, see Luz Estella Nagle, Evolution of the Colombian Judiciary
and the Constitutional Court, 6 IND. INT'L. & COMP. L. REV. 59 (1995). Professor Nagle is
a former Colombian judge.
6. The Court has also addressed a wide range of other contemporary constitutional
issues. See generally Manuel Jos6 Cepeda, Democracy, State, and Society in the 1991
Constitution: The Role of the Constitutional Court, in COLOMBIA: THE POLITICS OF
REFORMING THE STATE 71, 91(Eduardo Posada-Carbd ed., 1998)(noting that "[a]lmost all
key issues of modern constitutional law have been dealt with by the Court").
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that I move beyond the role of chronicler or annalist, it is to offer
some preliminary reflections7 on the contrast between the
Colombian Constitutional Court's avowedly activist interpretive
approach-itself a dramatic departure from longstanding
assumptions about the role of the judiciary under the
predominantly civil law legal traditions of Latin America'-and
the stern rebukes Justice Antonin Scalia and other purported
advocates of judicial restraint are currently leveling against the
traditional use of such approaches in interpreting the federal
constitution of the United States.9 In this respect, I believe that
the U.S. judiciary would do well to heed Ronald Dworkin's
admonition that we not "lose our nerve, when all around the
world other people, following our example, are gaining theirs."'
The 1991 Colombian Constitution was promulgated on July
4, 1991, after an initial draft1 was debated over a period of five
months by an elected constituent assembly that brought together
government officials, leaders of former guerrilla groups, and
representatives of indigenous peoples of Colombia. As Belisario
Betancur, President of Colombia from 1982-86, has recently
written, "the moment had come to 'shuffle and deal again."'
7. I hope to explore these issues in more depth in a later work on contemporary
Latin American constitutionalism. For further discussion of what has been described in
Colombia as the "New Constitutionalism" or the "Constitutionalism of Poverty," see
generally NUEVAS CORRIENTES DEL DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL COLOMBIANO (1994) (on
file with author); Eduardo Cifuentes Muhioz, La acci6n de tutela: el constitucionalismo de
la pobreza, in LECTURAS CONSTITUCIONALES ANDINAS 3, COMISION ANDINA DE JURISTAS
103 (1994).
8. See generally Nagle, supra note 5.
9. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997). Justice
John Paul Stevens has referred to Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating the federal Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act's interim provisions requiring state and local governments to conduct
background checks on prospective handgun purchasers) as "as activist" as Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating state law prohibiting use of contraceptives
by married persons). Speech by Justice Stevens to the Chicago Bar Association, America
and the Courts (C-Span broadcast, Oct. 24, 1998).
10. Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and
Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1268 (1997). See generally RONALD DWORKIN,
FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996).
11. Keith Rosenn has noted that Colombia's Constituent Assembly did not start
from scratch but worked from "a well organized and detailed draft prepared by a bright
young team of lawyers well versed in comparative constitutional law." Keith S. Rosenn, A
Comparison of the Protection of Individual Rights in the New Constitutions of Colombia
and Brazil, 23 U. MIAMI INTER-AMER. L. REV. 659, 661 (1992).
12. Belisario Bentancur, Prologue, Colombia: From the Actual to the Possible, in
COLOMBIA: THE POLITICS OF REFORMING THE STATE, supra note 6 at xix.
257
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
Women were vastly under-represented as members of the
Constitutional Assembly, 3 but women's rights organizations
lobbied 4 and found support for many gender justice provisions
among men and women within the Assembly. The new Charter
replaced an 1886 Constitution that lacked many of the
fundamental rights common in contemporary constitutions. A
product of compromise and consensus, the new Constitution
defines Colombia as an estado social de derecho, or social state of
law," and includes a broad "three generational" panoply of both
negative and positive or affirmative rights-including civil,
political, social, economic, cultural, and collective rights. 6
Expectations on behalf of women's rights activists and other
advocates of peace and social justice were high for the 1991
Colombian Constitution. Students who had come of age in
Colombia's exceptional contemporary culture of violence
campaigned for the new constitution, under the optimistic slogan:
"We can still save Colombia." 7 The Colombian Supreme Court
13. Of the seventy-four members of the Constitutional Assembly, only four were
women.
14. For discussion of some of the groups involved in this effort and of some of their
efforts, see Consuelo Cuesta Ch., Con rostro de mujer, in CONSTITUCION 1991: CAJA DE
HERRAMIENTAs 68 (Mario Jurich Dur6n ed., 1992).
15. Manuel Jos6 Cepeda, the dean of the Universidad de los Andes Law School who
served as adviser to President Gaviria on constitutional affairs, has described this concept
as uniting the rule of law with a social state and as representing a middle ground between
liberal and socialist notions of the state. Cepeda, supra note 6, at 86; see also Eduardo
Posada-Carb6, Reflections on the Colombian State: In Search of a Modern Role, in
COLOMBIA: THE POLITICS OF REFORMING THE STATE, supra note 6, at 7 (describing
Cepeda's interpretation of the concept). For references to this concept in German and
Spanish constitutional theory, see Cifuentes, supra note 7, at 104 n2.
16. For discussion of the generational developmental history of constitutional rights,
see Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U. CMI. L. REv. 519
(1992). For an argument that negative rights should play a principal role in Latin
American constitutionalism and against a positive constitution, see Cass R. Sunstein, The
Negative Constitution: Transition in Latin America, in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN
LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY (Irwin P. Stotzky ed., 1993). Sunstein
includes within his argument that a constitution should be negative, "the sense that it
should be directed against the deepest risks in the relevant nation's political culture," but
argues to exclude positive rights "largely because they are difficult to enforce through the
courts." Id. at 368-69. See also Keith S. Rosenn, The Success of Constitutionalism in the
United States and Its Failure in Latin America: An Explanation, 22 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV. 1, 26 (1990) (expressing the view that "aspirational or utopian provisions," such as
those dealing with family rights, health protection, and education, "seem far more
appropriate as part of a political platform or a sermon than in a constitution").
17. For a recent paper discussing the student movement from the perspective of
social movement theory, see John C. Dugas, The Origin, Impact, and Demise of the 1989-
1990 Colombian Student Movement: Insights From Social Movement Theory, Paper
[Vol. 30:2
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gave its approval to the reform process" with forward-looking
comments about the evolution of constitution-making and the
new roles constitutions play in the modern world. 9 The Court
foresaw that a new constitution could serve not just to distribute
and limit government power but also to "integrate diverse social
groups, to conciliate opposing interests," in the search for
"constitutional consensus" as a foundation for public order, social
harmony, and peace.2' Colombians referred to the new
Constitution as a "new social contract" or "new peace treaty."
21
One of the Constitution's main aims was to reform the prior
system radically by promoting participatory democracy and
transferring power to citizens so that they might be involved in
fundamental decisions affecting them in both the public and
private spheres. The other main aim was to strengthen the
judicial power.2 2 Women's rights advocates who participated in
the constitution-making shared the hope that a new constitution
could be instrumental in resolving the myriad and intersecting
forms of violence that have permeated their lives, ranging from
presented at the meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Chicago, Ill., Sept.
24-26, 1998 (manuscript on file with author).
18. For a discussion of the reform process, see William C. Banks & Edgar Alvarez,
The New Colombian Constitution: Democratic Victory or Public Surrender?, 23 U. OF
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 39 (1991).
19. For an excellent recent discussion of transitional constitutionalism, including
comments on the new Colombian Constitution, see Ruti Teitel, Transitional
Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106 YALE L.J. 2009, 2057-77
(1997). "Transitional constitutions not only operate as codifications of prevailing
consensus but also transform that consensus." Id. at 2076.
For general discussion of the role of the judiciary in democratic transitions in
Latin America, see TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE
JUDICIARY (Irwin P. Stotzky ed., 1993). For comparisons of women's participation in
transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule, see WOMEN AND DEMOCRACY: LATIN
AMERICA AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (Jane S. Jaquette & Sharon L. Wolchik
eds., 1998).
20. Sentencia de la Corte Suprema de Justicia Sobre el Decreto 927 de 1990, No.
2149 (334-E), May 25, 1990, reprinted in EDMUNDO LOPEZ GOMEz, LA VERDADERA
CONSTITUYENTE 169 (1990).
21. See Jayni Edelstein, Colombia: Impact of the New Constitution, 47 INT'L
COMMISSION OF JURISTS REV. 1 (1991). The Colombian Constitution is not a transitional
constitution in the usual sense, as Colombia has long been a formal representative
democracy. Amnesty International aptly refers to Colombia as a paradox. "[Blehind this
fagade of stability and democracy is a country plagued by internal conflict and appalling
levels of violence." AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, COLOMBIA, POLITICAL VIOLENCE: MYTH AND
REALITY 1 (1994). See generally JENNY PEARCE, COLOMBIA: INSIDE THE LABYRINTH
(1990).
22. Cepeda, supra note 6, at 72.
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domestic violence and other criminal activity to violence by
armed right- and left-wing groups and government forces. 3
Eight years after the tumultuous events surrounding the
adoption of the constitution, peace in Colombia still seems a
distant dream. 4 Despite the incorporation of guerrilla groups
23. For a description of how Colombian women's groups have analyzed their
society's interrelated forms of violence, see Socorro Ramfrez, Mujeres, Democracia y
Participaci6n, GACETA, Apr.-May 1991, at 49.
They have insisted on the necessity of transcending the reading of violence as
a simple listing of deaths and terrorist incidents, and upon the
appropriateness of also analyzing its internalization as a privileged form of
relation and as a mechanism to settle conflicts, in the home or in the street, in
the workplace or in organizations, and also those against the State .... They
have resisted those who think that one has to accommodate oneself to the
warlike spirit and that violence can only be answered in its own language. On
the contrary, they insist on the urgency of a civil and democratic construction
of peace and life.
At a recent conference on "Women, Justice, and Peace," held at the Buen Pastor
(Good Shepard) Women's Prison in Bogotd, Elsa Gladys Cifuentes, national director of
Equality for Women, called intrafamily violence the greatest and most immune form of
violence in the country and urged that it be given the same attention as negotiations with
the guerrillas. She argued that this everyday violence in the home is eating away the
social fabric and producing human beings who are insensitive to suffering and who accept
violence as the normal and justified way of resolving conflicts. Foro sobre mujer y justicia,
en el Buen Pastor, EL TIEMPO (Bogotd), Oct. 7, 1998. (Note from the editors of the Inter-
American Law Review: The reader will notice that El Tiempo articles are sometimes cited
without giving a specific page number. Although the author, Inter-Library Loan at the
University of Miami School of Law, and our friends in Colombia have tried to locate
hardcopies of all the articles, we have met with only partial success and have occasionally
been forced to rely on either poor copies without page numbers or copies retrieved from
the internet. For current articles in El Tiempo, please see their website at
<http://www.eltiempo.com>.
For further discussion of how Colombia's culture of violence affects women, see
Morgan, Constitution-Making, supra note 1. See also Donny Meertens, Victimas y
sobrevivientes de la guerra: tres mirados de gdnero, 34 REVISTA FORO 19 (June 1998).
Recent media accounts of women's participation in Colombian guerrilla groups could lead
other women to see them as alternative role models. Interview with Maria Isabel Plata,
supra note 4. For a comparative discussion of Peruvian women who have "chosen
violence" as leaders within the Maoist guerrilla group Sendero Luminoso or Shining Path,
see Maruja Barrig, Female Leadership, Violence, and Citizenship in Peru, in WOMEN AND
DEMOCRACY: LATIN AMERICA AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 19, at 104.
24. Harvey Kline captures the short-lived euphoria the new Constitution evoked:
On July 4, 1991, there was a rush of euphoria as the Constituent Assembly
presented the new Constitution. After the signing, the national orchestra
played Handel's "Hallelujah Chorus," television viewers saw members of the
assembly-men and women, former guerrillas and kidnapping victims,
indigenes and members of the oligarquia, Roman Catholics and
representatives of the evangelical movement--embracing each other. Some
seventy Colombians of different backgrounds had learned to get along with
each other. Yet the euphoria was short-lived; later that month Bogotd
newspapers were reporting on the activities of clean-up squads in Pereira, the
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such as the M-19 into the constitutional process, other groups
remain active.2 5  Both left-wing guerrilla and right-wing
paramilitary violence continues26 in the face of repeated efforts by
both former President Samper and now President Pastrana to
negotiate peace accords." In the judicial system alone, thirty-five
officials were assassinated in the six months prior to April 1998.28
The toll is similarly grim in other sectors, including journalists
and human rights advocates. Among journalists, for example, six
of the continent's thirteen violent deaths have occurred in
president's hometown.
HARVEY KLINE, COLOMBIA: DEMOCRACY UNDER ASSAULT, 137 (2d. ed. 1995).
25. Commenting on over three decades of guerrilla activity in Colombia, former
President Betancur says that "Colombians, with black humour, say that our guerrillas are
already a part of the establishment they are trying to fight." Betancur, supra note 12, at
XV.
26. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 21 (reporting that "[gluerrilla
groups active in Colombia in recent years have also contributed to the spiral of violence
with persistent disregard for the minimum humane standards established in
international humanitarian law," but finding that "[sltatistics compiled by independent
bodies and by the government itself clearly show that by far the greatest number of
political killings are the work of the Colombian armed forces and the paramilitary groups
they have created."). Id. at 5. Alexander Springer asserts, however, that the paramilitary
have long since emancipated themselves from their former military protectors.
Comments of Alexander Springer, Jan. 29, 1999 (on file with author).
27. For a recent assessment of the latest peace proposals, see Hctnr-Ledn Moncayo
S., Las condiciones sociales y politicas de la Paz en Colombia: La Apuesta del
Pragmatismo, Paper presented at the Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association,
Chicago, Ill., Sept. 24-26, 1998 (manuscript on file with author). He reiterates that
"reforms must be made, not because the guerrilla demands it but because, in justice, it
must be done. And because in this way, you change the social conditions and conditions of
exercise of power from which this type of violence comes." In a similar vein, former
President Belisario Betancur acknowledged in his 1994 presentation to the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development of ten requirements for peace that "in all
armed conflicts in Latin America there are subjective or personal agents-guerrillas-as
well as objective agents--a lack of social infrastructure, for example." See Betancur,
supra note 12, at xxiii.
28. Ellos sacan la cara por la justicia colombiana, EL TiEmpo (Bogoti), Apr. 5, 1998.
These recent killings take place against the backdrop of memories of the November 6,
1985, seizure of the Palace of Justice by the M-19 guerrilla movement after which over
100 persons, including eleven of the twenty-four members of the Supreme Court, lay dead
following the army's violent counterattack. See generally ANA CARRIGAN, THE PALACE OF
JUSTICE: A COLOMBIAN TRAGEDY (1993). (M-19, or Movement 19, refers to the date of the
fraudulent election on April 19, 1970, and also became the name for the guerrilla group
formed in 1972). Commenting on the situation of the predominantly women judges of the
lower courts, Luz Nagle points out that "lower court judges had such a low life
expectancy (about two years when I was a judge) that women lawyers were more
expendable and thus should fill those positions in the court system." Letter and
comments to the author from Professor Luz Estella Nagle, Nov. 12, 1998 (on file with
author).
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Colombia." The U.S. State Department reported that in 1997,
more than a third of the world's terrorist attacks (107 out of 304)
occurred in Colombia and 83% of the 128 Latin American attacks
took place there.' °  The prolonged violence has led to
overwhelming pessimism. In a poll published in April 1998, 85%
of Colombians responded that the country was in bad shape and
that they did not believe the situation was going to improve.31
But if it has fallen short of bringing peace, the new
Constitution has changed Colombians' views of constitutional
rights and of the role of courts in protecting these rights. By
combining broad substantive rights with a new Constitutional
Court and the availability of a streamlined writ of protection
called a tutela32 for claiming immediate protection of these rights,
the new charter has opened the judicial system to women and
other marginalized groups who before had little reason to
consider using Colombia's courts as a means of social redress.
Easy access to courts has its critics. Some Colombians have
complained that the country is suffering from an epidemic of
acute "tutelitis."3 In July 1995, the Colombian Congress came
29. Rafael Santos, Tristeza de colombiano, EL TIEMPO (Bogoti), Apr. 26, 1998. For a
first-hand account of the dangers of reporting on the drug wars, see MARIA JIMENA
DUZAN, DEATH BEAT: A COLOMBIAN JOURNALIST'S LIFE INSIDE THE COCAINE WARS (1994).
See also GABRIEL GARCIA MARQUEZ, NEWS OF A KIDNAPPING (1997).
30. Colombia, ins6lito record en terrorismo mundial, EL TIEMPO (Bogota), May 1,
1998. While acknowledging that violence is Colombian society's biggest problem,
Bogota's former mayor, Antanas Mockus, pointed out that "guerrilla[s], narcos, and paras
constitute only one fifth of the violence in the country." Alirio Fernando Bustos, Una
conducta ilicita cada 30 segundos," EL TIEMPO (Bogotd), May 4, 1998, at 13A. Studies
reveal that 80% of the violence consists of"common" crime. Id.
31. A sembraroptimismo, ELTIEMPO (Bogota), Apr. 28, 1998, at 4A.
32. Tutelas are actions to seek protection of fundamental constitutional rights
through orders similar to injunctions. Tutelas may be initiated in any court in the
country and must be resolved within ten days. Judgments are effective immediately
though subject to direct appellate review in the ordinary courts and to discretionary
review by the Constitutional Court. CONST. POL. COL. art. 86. See discussion infra, Part
II.B.
33. A defender of the tutela noted that it had been described as a "nasty creature," a
'monster," a "new King Kong" that is sowing chaos. "The president of the Supreme Court
referred to it in forums and interviews as an 'estorbo' (nuisance or obstacle) that will
plunge the judiciary to the bottom of the abyss; something that neither the narcotraflicing
nor the violence has achieved." Victor Guerrero Apr~iez, Huracdn sobre la tutela,
CONSTITUCI6N 1991: CAJA DE HERRAMIENTOS 96 (Mario Jurich Durdn ed., 1992).
Attempts to use tutelas to address seemingly trivial matters provide continual fuel for
those advocating reform. See, for example, the media report on recent tutelas filed by four
aspiring candidates for the title of Miss Colombia against the competition organizers for
excluding contestants from their localities from the competition. Reinado en los
1999] COLOMBIAN GENDER JURISPRUDENCE 263
close to adopting a court-packing plan that would have attempted
to change the Court's direction by adding six justices to the
Court, 4 and in 1997, it seriously considered but ultimately
rejected other proposals to reform the tutela and rein in the
Constitutional Court.3
Writing at a time when the new Colombian Constitution was
"still in diapers,"36 with the collaboration of Colombian women
studies specialist M6nica Alzate Buitrago, I described the
experiences of Colombian women in its adoption and examined
their hopes and fears for its implementation. 7 Here I explore the
early implementation of the constitution, focusing both on how
women have used the courts to assert their new constitutional
rights and liberties and on how the Constitutional Court has
begun to elaborate a gender jurisprudence grounded in
principles such as equality, autonomy, and tolerance.
What emerges is a picture of the Colombian Constitutional
Court's rapid and openly activist involvement in the society's
debates over issues such as gender and sexual orientation.
Justice Eduardo Cifuentes Mufioz, now President of the Court,
explains that the "Court's idea is that jurisprudence is a very
powerful instrument for changing cultural habits and,
particularly, prejudices." 8 The role of courts in so-called "culture
wars" has been hotly debated in the United States in recent
years. In cases dealing with gender and sexual orientation under
the U.S. Constitution, Justice Scalia has chastised the U.S.
Supreme Court for "taking sides" in the culture wars. He views
the issues raised in these cases as cultural debates that should be
tribunales, EL TIEMPO (Bogotd), Oct. 7, 1998.
34. Cepeda, supra note 6, at 90. The 1995 proposal also would have required a two-
thirds vote of the judges to invalidate laws. Id.
35. The proposed reforms were aimed at (1) reversing the Constitutional Court's
revision of tutelas against judicial opinions in certain circumstances and (2) lessening the
"burden" on the Supreme Court and other appellate courts of considering direct appeals of
tutelas. See discussion, infra, Part II.B.
36. Plinio Apuleyo Mendoza, Todavia en Paiales, EL TIEMPO (Bogotd), Aug. 26,
1991, at 5A.
37. See Morgan, Constitution-Making, supra note 1. For other early English
language commentary on the 1991 Constitution, see Rosenn, supra note 11; Donald T. Fox
& Anne Stetson, The 1991 Constitutional Reform: Prospects for Democracy and the Rule of
Law in Colombia, 24 CASE W. RES. J. INTL. L. 139 (1992).
38. Interview with Eduardo Cifuentes Mufioz, Magistrado of the Colombian
Constitutional Court, Bogotd, Colombia (July 5, 1995).
39. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 637-53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 566-603 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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left to the political processes and argues that, in the absence of
express constitutional prohibitions, courts have no proper basis
for striking down practices that follow longstanding social
traditions. While Justice Scalia's purportedly passive
constitutional methodology has not been embraced by a majority
of the U.S. Supreme Court, neither is the current Court
comfortable assuming a role such as the Warren Court played in
social change. Colombia's recent constitutional developments
present an opportunity for reflection on contrasting
constitutional and judicial approaches to the relationship
between the judiciary and the political processes."
In a larger sense, the Colombian Constitutional Court's
gender cases provide an opportunity to reflect on perhaps the
most fundamental question about constitutional law-does it
matter? Are constitutions destined to be "only paper, dead tree,
with ink on it," as Joel Bakan recently framed the question?41
Or, in the hands of litigants and judges who are willing to take
sides in their society's struggle to establish a culture of respect
for human rights, can a constitution become more than "just
words"? Progressive rights-talkers, including women's-rights-as-
human-rights-talkers, should continue to examine this question
as they monitor and evaluate the transformative effects of
contemporary constitutions.42
Part II of this Article gives an overview of the key
substantive and procedural features of the new Colombian
Constitution that have enabled and encouraged women's rights
40. For general treatments of these issues in U.S. legal scholarship, see, for
example, JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). For discussion of related issues under the 1991
Colombian Constitution, see Sandra Morelli Rico, lLa Corte Constitucional: Un legislador
complementario? 45 TEMAS DE DERECHO PIBLICO (1997).
41. JOEL BAKAN, JUST WORDS: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND SOCIAL WRONGS
(1997). In this recent critique of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Bakan
concludes that, given its failure to take private power seriously, the Charter can have
little effect on people's "real lives." See Didi Herman, Book Review, Just Words;
Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs by Joel Bakan, 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 407
(1997).
42. For recent commentary describing and evaluating substantive and procedural
protections for human rights in contemporary constitutions, see, for example Rosenn,
supra note 11; Ren6 Provost, Emergency Judicial Relief for Human Rights Violations in
Canada and Argentina, 23 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 93 (1992); Special Issue: The
South African Constitution in Transition, 3 REV. OF CONST. STUD. (1996); Brice Dickson,
Protecting Human Rights Through a Constitutional Court: The Case of South Africa, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 531 (1997).
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advocates to bring legal challenges to a wide range of
discriminatory laws and practices. Part III discusses some of the
gender-related cases that have been decided under these
provisions from 1992 through 1998 and presents views on these
cases by some of the participants in the early development of the
country's gender jurisprudence. Part IV takes a broader look at
how Colombians assess the early work of the Constitutional
Court, with particular attention to its gender decisions and its
treatment of tutelas. The final section offers some comparative
reflections on the Colombian Court's interpretive approach and
on what the Colombian experience suggests about the
transformative potential of constitutions in the area of gender
and sexual orientation. I conclude that the Constitutional
Court's early gender jurisprudence provides an important, albeit
limited, example of judicial commitment to making a constitution
more than "just words" in the war against machismo43 and for a
human rights culture." But, with the terms of most of the
43. For a review of definitions and theories of machismo, see ELIZABETH E. BRUSCO,
THE REFORMATION OF MACHISMO: EVANGELICAL CONVERSION AND GENDER IN COLOMBIA
77-91 (1995). The Spanish word macho literally means a male animal. The classic
definition in U.S. literature is Stevens' description of machismo as "the cult of virility,"
the chief characteristics of which are "exaggerated aggressiveness and intransigence in
male-to-male interpersonal relationships and arrogance and sexual aggression in male-to-
female relations." Evelyn Stevens, Marianismo: The Other Face of Machismo in Latin
America, in FEMALE AND MALE IN LATIN AMERICA (Ann M. Pescatello ed., 1973).
44. Less dramatically perhaps, women's right activists in other parts of Latin
America have also increasingly (and sometimes successfully) turned to the courts in their
battles against gender discrimination in recent years. The trend is particularly evident in
Costa Rica where in 1989, a new Sala IV of the Supreme Court was established to handle
constitutional issues. See generally ZARELA VILLANUEVA MONGE & ALEXANDRA
BOGANTES RODRIGUEZ, PRINCIPIO DE IGUALDAD Y JURISPRUDENCIA CONSTITUCIONAL
(1995) (analyzing the gender cases of the Costa Rican Supreme Court and its Sala IV). For
example, in August 1992, the Costa Rican Supreme Court ruled on a challenge brought by
Costa Rican women to a regulation requiring a husband's consent for a married woman's
sterilization, stating that if the regulation were applied in this manner it would be
unconstitutional. Expediente No. 1496-M-91, Vote No. 2196-92 (Aug. 11, 1992). In June
1994, the Costa Rican Court held that social security regulations allowing widows'
pensions in cases of de facto unions only if the couple had lived together for five years or
had children were unconstitutionally discriminatory. Expediente No. 1569-V-91, Vote No.
2648-94 (June 7, 1994). But in November 1992, the Court rejected a challenge to the
practice of awarding lower monetary prizes in women's sports competitions than in men's
events. Expediente No. 2910-S-92, Vote No. 3444-92 (Nov. 13, 1992) (The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights also rejected a challenge to this practice under the
American Convention, finding that the applicant lacked standing. Montoya v. Costa Rica,
Report No. 48/96, Case 11.553 (Oct. 16, 1996).) In January 1994, the Costa Rican
Supreme Court ruled on behalf of a man who challenged a provision in the Law for the
Promotion of Women's Social Equality that required property obtained through
government programs to be registered in the name of the woman in cases of de facto
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current Justices ending in 2001, and as the Court confronts
negative media reports of a 5-4 split among the justices and
renewed calls for judicial reform,5 it remains to be seen whether
the footholds it has established will translate into lasting change
for Colombians.
II. RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
A. Background of the Constitution's Substantive
Gender-Related Guarantees
During the early stages of contemporary Latin American
women's movements,46 leaders generally placed low strategic
unions. Expediente No. 1237-90, Voto No. 94 (Jan. 18, 1994). For a discussion of the
Costa Rican women's movement generally, see The Costa Rican Women's Movement: A
Reader (Ilse Abshagen Leitinger ed. & trans., 1997).
For information on women's resort to the Guatemalan Constitutional Court, see
ACCION DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD POR DISCRIMINACION A LA MUJER EN EL CODIGO PENAL,
CENTRO PARA LA AccION LEGAL EN DERECHOS HUMANOS (n.d.) (documenting Guatemalan
women's rights activists' March 7, 1996, success in the Guatemalan Constitutional Court
in their challenge to the penal code's discriminatory treatment of adultery) (on file with
author). See Guatemalan Constitutional Court, Expediente 936-95, decision of Mar. 7,
1996. Earlier, the Guatemalan Constitutional Court rejected a challenge to
discriminatory provisions of the Guatemalan Civil Code, including its requirement that
married women seek their husband's consent to work outside the home. See Guatemalan
Constitutional Court, Expediente 84-92, decision of June 24, 1993. One judge dissented
from this decision. Vote Razonado del Magistrado Gabriel Larios Ochaita. Following the
Constitutional Court's decision upholding these civil code provisions, on February 8, 1995,
a challenge to them was filed before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
Letter from Maria Eugenia de Sierra and Center for Justice and International Law
(CEJIL) to Ambassador Edith Mdrquez Rodriguez, Executive Director of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, Feb. 8, 1995 (on file with author). The Inter-
American Commission delayed action in the case until an individual claiming to be
affected by the law was added as a party but then reportedly ruled favorably on the case
in late 1998.
For discussion of early gender and sexual orientation cases in the Nicaraguan Supreme
Court, see Martha I. Morgan, The Bitter and the Sweet. Feminist Efforts to Reform
Nicaraguan Rape and Sodomy Laws, 26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 439 (1995).
45. See discussion, infra, Part IV.
46. For a history of Latin American women's movements, see FRANCESCA MILLER,
LATIN AMERICAN WOMEN AND THE SEARCH FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE (1991). See also LATIN
AMERICAN WOMEN, COMPARED FIGURES 177-94 (1995). For a discussion of the history of
the Colombian women's movements, see Morgan, Constitution-Making, supra note 1, and
its cited sources. For a comparison of women's participation in transitions from
authoritarian to democratic regimes in Latin America and Eastern and Central Europe,
see WOMEN AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 19. For a recent report on the status of women's
rights in the Americas, see REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE AMERICAS, OEA / Ser. L1V/11.100, Doc. 17 (Oct.
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priority on litigation. The reasons were both ideological and
pragmatic. On a theoretical level, many questioned the utility of
law as a tool for changing societal beliefs and attitudes
underlying machismo, the region's harsh brand of gender
subordination. On a more practical level, they were dubious
about the role that their slow, weak, and sometimes corrupt
judicial systems could play in eradicating discriminatory laws or
practices. And as former judge Luz Nagle stresses, "almost every
single higher court position was filled by a man, while the lower
courts where I served were predominately women."'7
A recent study by researchers at Colombia's National
University documents women's continuing tendency to resort to
institutions other than the judicial system, at least in the first
instance, to resolve conflicts. 8 Research also shows that while
women who did turn to the courts won their cases more
frequently than men did in family matters,4" men were more
successful in cases in the labor area.50 For women, distrust and
lack of knowledge of the judicial system have often translated
into avoidance.
As Maria Cristina Calder6n, Director of Legal Services for
PROFAMILIA, points out, there has also been an uneasy
relationship between leaders of the feminist movement and
women's rights lawyers:
Immediately, they [feminist leaders] think that we [women's
rights lawyers] have little sensitivity, that we don't
understand the social problems, that we are not
13, 1998).
47. Letter from Professor Luz Estella Nagle to author, supra note 28.
48. REPUESTA AL CUESTIONARIO SOBRE LA CONDICION DE LA MUJER EN LAS
AM2RICAS: COLOMBIA, INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, citing
MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA Y DEL DERECHO, UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DE COLOMBIA,
FACULTAD DE DERECHO, CIENCIAS POLITICAS Y SOCIALES, DIRECCION GENERAL DE
POLITICAS JURIDICAS Y DESARROLLO LEGISLATIVO, "GIINERO Y JUSTIcLA,": EsTuDIO SOBRE
LA INCIDENCA DE LA MUJER EN LOS FALLOS JUDICIALES, LA ACCI6N DE TUTELA Y LA
VIOLENCIA CARCELARIA, UNIDAD DE INVESTIGACIONES JUIDICAS Y SOCIALES, GERARDO
MOLINA UNIJUS [hereinafter REPUESTA AL CUESTIONARIO] (on file with the Inter-American
Law Review).
49. There is, however, Luz Nagle points out, "natural law doctrine imbedded in the
code regarding family matters and the woman's role in the family unit. Consequently, the
stereotype of macho society is reinforced." Letter from Professor Luz Estella Nagle to
author, supra note 28.
50. Mujeres examinan como les aplican la ley, 198 MUJER/FEMPRESS (Santiago),
Apr. 1998, at 16.
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anthropologists or sociologists or psychologists but are
formalists. And we think, or I think,.. .that to refuse to
acknowledge the value of law as an instrument is also an
error. The law does not change things just like that. But it is
a grand instrument. And you have to work with the laws we
have or change them or find other laws. But we cannot
separate ourselves from the law. We are in a state of law.51
Despite lingering skepticism about rights-based discourse as
a means of pursuing social justice, Colombian women's groups,
like their counterparts throughout Latin America, adopted much
of the law reform-laden agenda of the international women's
movement during the 1970s and 1980s, and Colombians ratified
the rights-based Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)52 in 1981. " CEDAW,
with its broad definition of discrimination against women" and
its approval of positive discrimination, 5 provided a model for
legal reform.5 6  During Colombia's constitutional assembly,
women's rights organizations, working both inside and outside
the assembly, sought to incorporate the principles of CEDAW
into the new constitution.57 Although women were vastly
51. Interview with Maria Cristina Calder6n, supra note 2. See also Maria Isabel
Plata & Maria Cristina Calder6n, Legal Services: Putting Rights Into Action-
PROFAMILIA-Colombia, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (1995).
52. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (1981). Formally, CEDAW refers to the committee charged
with maintaining the convention but this acronym also has become used commonly to
refer to the convention itself.
53. Ley 51 de 1981. The definition of discrimination had been further developed in a
1990 decree:
Discrimination can be direct or indirect.
Direct discrimination exists when a person receives a treatment less
favorable than another because one belongs to one or the other sex.
Indirect discrimination means the application of conditions of employment
that although equal in a formal sense, in practice favor one sex over the other.
Decreto 1398, "Por el Cual se Desarrolla la Ley 51 de 1981, Que Aprueba la Convenci6n
sobre la Eliminaci6n de Todas las Formas de Discriminaci6n Contra la Mujer Adoptado
por las Naciones Unidas" (July 3, 1990).
54. CEDAW, art. 1, 1249 U.N.T.S. 16.
55. Id. art. 4, 1249 U.N.T.S. 16.
56. For case studies of how CEDAW has been used to shape constitutional
legislative norms, to litigate on behalf of women's rights, and to influence governmental
policies, see BRINGING EQUALITY HOME: IMPLEMENTING THE CONVENTION ON THE
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN CEDAW (Ilana
Landsberg-Lewis ed., 1998).
57. See PROPUESTAS DE MUJERES A LA ASAMBLEA NACIONAL CONSTITUYENTE (Jan.
1991); Sin los derechos de la mujer la democracia no va, EL TIEMFO (Bogotd), Apr. 28,
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underrepresented in the constitutional assembly, the feminist
agenda was not lost: Colombia's 1991 Constitution recognizes
both the equal rights of women and the State's positive obligation
to "promote conditions of equality."8
As a result of the efforts of women's organizations and of the
parallel efforts of supportive men and women within the
constitutional assembly, the constitution contains several formal
guarantees related to women's rights. First, in stark contrast to
the 1886 Constitution it replaced, the 1991 Constitution
expressly reflects both CEDAW's prohibition on discrimination
against women and its approval of special positive measures as a
means of assuring substantive rather than merely formal
equality. Article 13 of the new Constitution incorporates these
twin principles of equality:
All persons are born free and equal before the law, will receive
the same protection and treatment from the authorities, and
will enjoy the same rights, liberties and opportunities without
any discrimination for reasons of sex, race, national or family
origin, language, religion, or political or philosophical opinion.
The State will promote conditions so that equality will be real
and effective and will adopt measures in favor of groups
discriminated against or marginalized.
The State will specially protect those persons who because of
their economic, physical or mental condition find themselves
in circumstances of manifest weakness and will punish abuses
and mistreatment that are committed against them.59
1991. For a detailed discussion of these proposals, see Morgan, Constitution-Making,
supra note 1, at 375-80. See also Maria Isabel Plata, Reproductive Rights as Human
Rights-Colombia, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 515, 517-19 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994).
58. CONST. POL. COL. art. 13.
59. Id.
Todas las personas nacen libres e iguales ante la ley, recibirdn la misma
proteci6n y trato de las autoridades y gozardn de los mismos derechos,
libertades y oportunidades sin ninguna discriminaci6n por razones de sexo,
raza, origen nacional o familiar, Iengua, religi6n, opini6n politica or filos6fica.
El Estado promoverd las condiciones para que la igualdad sea real y efectiva y
adoptarA medidas en favor de grupos discriminados or marginados.
El Estado protegerd especialmente a aquellas personas que por su
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The Constitutional Court's early decisions under Article 13
relied on principles of reasonableness and proportionality derived
from European law; more recently the Court has also employed
the concept of levels of scrutiny drawing both on cases from the
European Court of Human Rights and on cases from the U.S.
Supreme Court. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, however, the
Colombian Court has applied "strict scrutiny" and placed a
heavy burden of proof on the defender of the challenged action
when faced with discrimination based on sex (and, more recently,
sexual orientation) as well as' when dealing with infringements
upon fundamental rights."
In addition to Article 13's general equality guarantee, Article
40 provides that "the authorities will guarantee the adequate and
effective participation of women in the decision-making levels of
Public Administration, 61 Article 42 states that "family relations
are based in the equality of rights and duties of couples and in
reciprocal respect among all its members,"62 and Article 43
declares: "Women and men have equal rights and opportunities.
Women cannot be subjected to any type of discrimination." 63
condici6n econ6mica, fisca o mental, se encuentran en circunstancia de
debilidad manifesta y sancionard los abusos o maltratos que contra ellas se
cometan.
The draft of Article 13 that emerged from the Constitutional Assembly's Committee did
not incorporate the concept of affirmative or positive discrimination but the version
approved in the plenary debates tracked language proposed by assembly member Maria
Teresa Garcds and others that incorporated both negative and positive concepts of
equality as called for in proposals by women's groups. See Morgan, Constitution-Making,
supra note 1, at 381.
60. See, e.g., Sentencia No. C-481J98 (strict scrutiny is applicable to a law treating
homosexuality as a grounds of misconduct for teachers because if sexual orientation is
biologically determined, the law is equivalent to a sex classification and if sexual
preference involves personal choice, the law infi-nges on the right to the free development
of one's personality). See discussion infra, Part III.B.5. See generally Eduardo Cifuentes
Mufioz, Mujer e igualdad, Paper presented at Conference in Guayaquil, Colombia, Sept.
27, 1996 (on file with author); C~sar A. Rodriguez, El test de razonabilidad y el derecho a
la igualdad, OBSERVATORIO DE JUSTICIA CONSTITUCIONAL: BALANCE JURISPRUDENCIAL DE
1996 (1998).
61. CONST. POL. COL. art. 40. "... Las autoridades garantizardn la adecuada y
efectiva participaci6n de la mujer en los niveles de la administraci6n pdblica." In 1992,
however, the Council of State, in a case filed by Angela Cuevas de Dolmestch, rejected the
argument that based on Article 40 it should nullify the President's Decree naming his
cabinet because it contained only one woman. Expediente No. 0589, 21 Revista Mensual
579 (1992).
62. CONST. POL. COL. art. 42. ... Las relaciones familiares se basan en la igualdad
de derechos y deberes de la pareja y en el respeto reciproco entre todos sus integrantes."
63. CONST. POL. COL. art. 43. "La mujer y el hombre tienen iguales derechos y
oportunidades. La mujer no podrd ser sometida a ninguna clase de discriminaci6n...."
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Finally, Article 53 includes equality of opportunity and special
protection for women, maternity, and minors among the
fundamental principles to be considered by Congress in enacting
a labor law."
One of the most controversial features of the new
constitution was its extension of civil divorce to religious
marriages. According to Article 42, "[t]he civil effects of all
marriages will be terminated by divorce according to the civil
law." 5 Article 42 also recognizes that a family can be formed by
"natural or judicial bonds, by the free decision of a man and a
woman to contract marriage or by the responsible will to form
it," ' and, as mentioned above, guarantees equality of rights
among couples. It further provides: "Any form of violence within
the family is considered destructive of its harmony and unity,
and will be punished according to the law." "
Having confronted the Church on the issue of divorce, the
Constitutional Assembly was unwilling to confront it a second
time with respect to abortion. Although Article 42 also
recognizes the right of couples "to freely and responsibly decide
the number of their children, " the constitutional assembly
rejected demands of women's groups that free choice about
motherhood, including the right to legalized abortion, be
explicitly guaranteed. On the other hand, Article 43 guarantees
special state assistance and protection to women during
64. CONST. POL. COL. art. 53. "El Congreso expedird el estatuto del trabajo. La ley
correspondiente tendrd en cuenta por los menos los siguientes principios minimos
fundamentales: Igualdad de oportunidades para los trabajadores; ... protecci6n especial a
la mujer, a la maternidad y al trabajador menor de edad."
65. CONST. POL. COL. art. 42. "...Los efectos civiles de todo matrimonio cesarin por
divorcio con arreglo a la ley civil...."
66. CONST. POL. COL. art. 42. "La familia es el ndcleo fundamental de la sociedad.
Se constituye por vfnculos naturales o juridicos, por la decisi6n libre de un hombre y una
mujer de contraer matrimonio o por la voluntad responsable de conformarla...."
67. Id. "Calquier forma de violencia en la familia se considera destructiva de su
armonia y unidad, y serd sancionada conforme a la ley...."
68. Id. "La pareja tiene derecho a decidir libre y responsablemente el nfimero de sus
hijos,." In May 1992, the Ministry of Health issued a resolution ordering all health
institutions to guarantee women the right to decide on issues affecting their health or
sexuality. But in July 1993, the Council of State opined that the new constitution
required the mutual consent of the couple (and thus allowed a spousal veto) for obtaining
family planning services. Plata & Calder6n, supra note 51, at 1109 (1995) (citing Consejo
de Estado, Sala de lo Contencioso Administrativo, Exp. No 7795 (July 1993)). The Council
of State's interpretation did not have a direct effect and has been undercut by later
decisions of the Constitutional Court. Interview with Maria Isabel Plata, supra note 4.
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pregnancy and after birth, including "support benefits from it if
they then become unemployed or abandoned."69 It further
provides that the "State will provide help in a special manner to
women heads of family."" And, as mentioned above, protection
for maternity is also among the fundamental principles that
Article 53 directs lawmakers to consider in enacting a labor law.
Other articles that women have used in their legal attacks
include Article 11's right to life;71 Article 12's prohibition of cruel,
inhumane, or degrading treatment;72Article 15's guarantee to all
persons of the "right to personal and family privacy and to their
good name;"" Article 16's recognition that "all persons have the
right to the free development of their personality without
limitations except those imposed by the rights of others and the
legal order;"74 Article 18's guarantee of freedom of conscience;"
Article 21's right to dignity;
76 and Article 67's right to education.
77
Also significant are Articles 93 and 94 regarding international
human rights law and unenumerated human rights:
Article 93. International treaties and conventions ratified by
the Congress that recognize human rights and that prohibit
their limitation in states of emergency have priority in the
internal order.
69. CONST. POL. COL. art. 43. "...Durante el embarazo y despus del parto gozard de
especial asistencia y protecci6n del Estado, y recibird de este subsidio alimentario si
entonces estuviera desempleada o desamparada...."
70. Id. "... El Estado apoyard de manera especial a la mujer cabeza de familia."
71. CONST. POL. COL. art. 11. "El derecho a ]a vida es inviolable. No habrd pena de
muerte."
72. CONST. POL. COL. art. 12. "Nadie ser6 sometido a desaparici6n forzades a
torturas ni a tratos o penas crueles, inhumanos o degradantes."
73. CONST. POL. COL. art. 15. "Todas las personas tienen derecho a su intimidad
personal y familiar y a su buen nombre, y el Estado debe respetarlos y hacerlos
respetar...."
74. CONST. POL. COL. art. 16. "Todas las personas tienen derecho al libre desarrollo
de su personalidad sin mds limitaciones que las que imponen los derechos de los demds y
el ordenjuridico." Compare Article 2(1) of the 1949 Basic Law of the Republic of Germany
and similar provisions in the constitution of France, Italy, and Spain.
75. CONST. POL. COL. art. 18. "Se garantiza la libertad de conciencia. Nadie serd
molestado por raz6n de sus convicciones o creencias ni compelido a revelarlas ni obligado
a actuar contra su conciencia."
76. CONST. POL. COL. art. 21. "Se garantiza el derecho a la honra. La ley sefialard
la forma de su protecci6n."
77. CONST. POL. COL. art. 67. "La educaci6n es un derecho de la persona y un
servicio piblico que tiene una funci6n social...."
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The rights and duties consecrated in this Charter will be
interpreted in accordance with international treaties on
human rights ratified by Colombia. 8
Article 94. The enunciation of rights and guarantees
contained in the Constitution and international conventions in
effect should not be understood as a negation of others which,
being inherent to the human being, are not expressly
contained in them. 9
Finally, Article 85 provides that many of the constitution's
78.CONST. POL. COL. art. 93. Los tratados y convenios internacionales
ratificados por el congreso, que reconocen los derechos humanos y que
prohiben su limitaci6n en los estados de excepci6n, prevalecen en el orden
interno.
Los derechos y deberes consagrados en esta Carta, se interpretar~n de
conformidad con los tratados internacionales sobre derechos humanos
ratificados por Colombia.
For a discussion of similar provisions incorporating international human rights laws in
recent constitutions in Latin America and elsewhere and analysis of the relationship
between international law and internal law in protecting human rights, see Antonio
Cangado Trinade, La interaccidn entre el derecho internacional y el derecho interno en la
protecci6n del los derechos humanos, EL JUEZ Y LA DEFENSA DE LA DEMOCRAcIA: UN
ENFOQUE A PARTIR DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS 233 (1993). See also BRINGING EQUALITY
HOME, supra note 56. For an illustration of the Colombian Constitutional Court's reliance
on Article 93 as incorporating provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the American Convention on Human Rights,
and the International Pact on Human Rights, see Sentencia No. T-273/93. Similarly, the
Guatemalan Constitutional Court relied in part on the Guatemalan Constitution's
incorporation of International Conventions in its 1996 decision invalidating its country's
penal code's discriminatory treatment of adultery. See supra note 44. For a more general
discussion of how human rights guaranteed by the Inter-American Convention on Human
rights have been upheld by the highest courts of state parties to the Convention, see Jo M.
Pasqualucci, The Inter-American Human Rights System: Establishing Precedents and
Procedure in Human Rights Law, 26 U. MIAMI INTER.-AM. L. REV. 297, text accompanying
notes 315 and 316 (1995) (discussing the Constitutional Chamber of the Costa Rican
Supreme Court's reliance on an advisory opinion by the Inter-American Court in ruling
that a naturalization law could not discriminate based on gender, Expediente 2965-S-91,
Voto: 3435-92, Nov. 11, 1992).
79. CONST. POL.COL. art. 94. "La enunciaci6n de los derechos y garantias contenidos
en al Constituci6n y en los convenios internacionales vigentes, no debe entenderse como
negaci6n de otras que, siendo inherentes a la persona humana, no figuren expresamente
en ellos."
Manuel Jos6 Cepeda points to the Ninth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as
the source for this provision and argues that as an express recognition of natural law,
Article 94 provides a principle for interpretation of the 1991 Constitution's "silences"-
that is, its protection of rights contained in draft provisions that the constitutional
assembly rejected or failed to approve. MANUEL JosE CEPEDA, LA CONSTITUCi6N QUE NO
FUE Y EL SIGNIFICADO DE LOS SILENCIOS CONSTITUCIONALES 27-28(1994).
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fundamental rights, including those in Article 13, are of
immediate application."0
B. The Constitutional Court, the Tutela, and
Other Constitutional Procedures for Protecting
Fundamental Rights
The gender-related guarantees of the 1991 Constitution
provide litigants with new textual hooks for challenging
numerous discriminatory practices, and the Constitutional Court
undertook an impressive media campaign to educate people
about their rights under the new constitution." Three features of
the 1991 Colombian Constitution provide important judicial
mechanisms for the protection of its newly recognized
fundamental rights and liberties. Two of these are new: the
creation of a separate Constitutional Court and the introduction
of the tutela. The third feature, the public action of
unconstitutionality, existed under prior law but has taken on
new significance with the creation of the Constitutional Court.
Article 4 of the Constitution recognizes the supremacy of the
Constitution as law, providing that it is "norma de normas" and
that "[iun all cases of incompatibility between the Constitution
and the law or other legal norm, the constitutional dispositions
shall be applied.82 Article 241 entrusts the Constitutional Court
with the "safeguarding of the integrity and supremacy of the
80. CONST. POL. COL. art. 85: "The rights established in articles 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,
16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 37, and 40 are of immediate
application."
81. Interview with Manuel Jos6 Cepeda, Dean of the School of Law fo the
Universidad de los Andes and constitutional advisor to President Gaviria during the
adoption of the 1991 Constitution, BogotA, Colombia (Dec. 15, 1998). According to Maria
Isabel Plata, Executive Director of PROFAMILIA, however, the mere knowledge of the
existence of formal rights means little to the average Colombian woman unless she also
has sufficient self-esteem to insist that her rights be respected and has access to
economical and efficient judicial mechanisms for their enforcement. Interview with Maria
Isabel Plata, BogotA, Colombia (June 29, 1995). See also Plata & Calder6n, supra note 51.
82. CONST. POL. COL. art. 4. Writing in the Constitutional Court's Report on its
work from 1992-95, Magistrado Auxiliar Rodrigo Uprimny describes the new constitution
as imposing "a new vision of the judicial ordering and a new form of interpreting and
applying rights," and as creating a "new paradigm of the legal relationship between the
state and individuals." DESARROLLO JURISPRUDENCIAL DE LA CONSTITUCION POLITICA 104
(1995). He stresses, in this regard, the importance of Article 4's recognition of the
constitution as law and as superior to all other laws or judicial norms. Id. at 102-103.
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Constitution." 3 Members of the Court are selected by the Senate
from lists of three candidates submitted by the President, the
Supreme Court, and the Council of State. 4 After interim one-year
appointments under the Constitution's transitional provisions,
justices serve eight year terms and are limited to a single term.
The Court is currently composed of nine justices, or magistrados;
all are men.85 With the exception of Justice Alfredo Beltr~n
Sierra, who was appointed to fill a vacancy created by the
resignation of Justice Jorge Arango Mejfa in April 1998, and
Justice Alvaro Tafur Galvis, who was appointed to the vacancy
created when Justice Hernando Herrera Vergara resigned in
February 1999, the current members were appointed to the first
full terms under the new Constitution in 1993. (Several of the
justices also served among the seven member interim one-year
appointments provided for in Transitory Article 22).86 In 1993,
83. Among other functions, the Constitutional Court is to:
1. Decide on the petitions of unconstitutionality brought by citizens against
measures amending the Constitution, no matter what their origin, exclusively
for errors of procedure in their formation.
2. Decide, prior to a popular expression of opinion, on the constitutionality of
the call for a referendum or a constituent assembly to amend the
Constitution, exclusively for errors in the procedure of their formation.
3. Decide on the constitutionality of referendums about laws and popular
consultations and plebiscites of a national scope, in case of these last ones,
exclusively for errors of procedure in their convocation and implementation.
4. Decide on petitions of unconstitutionality brought by citizens against the
laws, both for their substantive content and for errors of procedure in their
formation.
8. Decide in definitive manner on the constitutionality of bills opposed by the
government as unconstitutional and of proposed statutory bills, both as to
their substantive content and for procedural errors in their formation.
9. Revise, in the form determined by law, the judicial decisions connected
with the actions of tutela [protection] of constitutional rights.
10. Decide in definitive manner on the feasibility of international treaties and
the laws approving them....
11. Draft its own bylaws.
CONST. POL. COL. art. 241.
84. CONST. POL. COL. art. 239.
85. Women have served as temporary and interim judges on the Court, and women's
names have been included on the lists presented to Congress but (with the exception of a
woman who was named to the initial one-year Court but resigned) no woman has been
appointed to a permanent position on the Court. See Interview with Martha Sdchica de
Moncaleano, acting Judge and Secretary General of the Constitutional Court, by
Alexander Springer, BogotA, Colombia (Mar. 26, 1999).
86. CONST. POL. COL. art. transitorio 22. Seven members were appointed to serve
one-year terms, with two named by the President, and one each named by the Supreme
Court, the Council of State, and the Prosecutor General. These five named the remaining
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the Senate appointed the justices by consensus as a "package,"
thus providing a more representative body than would otherwise
have been possible. 7
Colombia's tutela" allows any person to seek immediate
judicial protection of their fundamental constitutional rights.
Article 86 provides that the action may be filed with any justice
and must be ruled on within ten days. Although orders granting
tutelas may be appealed to higher courts and are subject to
discretionary review by the Constitutional Court, under the
implementing decree they must be complied with within forty-
eight hours of the initial order granting protection.
Colombia's new writ of protection for fundamental rights
initially was inspired by the Mexican amparo, an action that
somewhat resembles but is much broader than the writ of habeas
corpus,8 and by similar amparo provisions in the 1978 Spanish
Constitution." But as adopted by the 1991 Constitutional
Assembly, after a study of various countries' mechanisms for
protecting fundamental rights, the tutela, as described in Article
86 of the new Constitution, is uniquely Colombian.91 The tutela is
designed to provide "immediate protection of ... fundamental
constitutional rights, when any of these [rights] are violated or
two members from lists presented by the President. Failure to appoint the initial five
justices within five days after the Constitution became effective was to be considered bad
conduct. Transitory Article 23 granted the President extraordinary authority to prepare a
decree establishing procedures for the Constitutional Court within two months of the
promulgation of the Constitution, stipulating that the Congress could repeal or modify
these rules. CONST. POL. COL. art. transitorio 23. Transitory Article 5 (b) specifically
authorized the President to draft a decree regulating the right of tutela. CONST. POL.
COL. art. transitorio 5 (b). See Decree 2591 of 1991 (Nov. 19, 1991) (regulating the tutela).
The Constitution abolished the sitting Congress and Transitory Article 1 provided for
elections for an initial interim Congress in October 1991; a special commission of thirty
persons elected by the Constitutional Assembly was created and authorized to approve
the decrees prepared by the president in the use of his extraordinary powers.
87. Interview with Manuel Jos6 Cepeda, supra note 81.
88. Cassell's Spanish Dictionary defines tutela as "tutelage, tutorage, guardianship,
protection." For a more in-depth discussion of the origin of Colombia's tutela and its Latin
American antecedents, see PEDRO PABLO CAMARGO, MANUAL DE LA ACCION DE TUTELA
(1994).
89. Article 30 of the 1991 Colombian Constitution guarantees the right to invoke
habeas corpus and requires that once invoked it must be complied with within 36 hours.
For a general discussion of the antecedents of amparo and habeas corpus, see the
discussion by Costa Rican Professor of Constitutional Law Rub6n Hernmndez Valle, in LA
TUTELA DE LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES (1990).
90. Edelstein, supra note 21, at 5.
91. Interview with Manuel Josd Cepeda, supra note 81.
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threatened by the action or omission of any public authority."
9 2
The remedy consists of an injunctive order, which is immediately
effective, though also subject to appeal.93  All tutelas are
forwarded to the Constitutional Court, which has discretionary
review. 4  Except where used as a temporary mechanism
necessary to avoid irremediable harm, the action of tutela will
proceed only if no other judicial defense of constitutional rights is
available.95 The Constitution also includes a special provision
with respect to collective interests and the "horizontal" use of
tutelas:
The law will establish those cases in which the action of tutela
will proceed against individuals charged with rendering a
public service or whose conduct seriously and directly affects
the collective interest, or with respect to whom the applicant
is found in a state of subordination or vulnerability
(indefensi6n).96
The Constitutional Court has interpreted "fundamental
rights" of the tutela provision broadly. According to the Court
"fundamental rights" protected by the tutela are not limited to
those enumerated in the Constitution under the rubric
"Fundamental Rights" (Articles 11-41). 7  The Court has
92. CONST. POL. COL. art. 86.
93. Id.
94. Id. Justice Jorge Arango Mejia explained that the Court chooses to review tutela
actions on the basis of their importance or the magnitude of the constitutional violation
involved. Interview with Jorge Arango Mejia, Magistrado of the Colombian
Constitutional Court, BogotA, Colombia (July 5, 1995). As Keith Rosenn has noted the
tutela "makes Colombia an unusual hybrid, combining a decentralized form of judicial
review with a constitutional court." Rosenn, supra note 11, at 684.
95. CONST. POL. COL. art. 86.
96. CONST. POL. COL. art. 86. See also Decree 2591 de 1991 (Nov. 19. 1991)
(implementing Article 86), Gaceta Legislativa No. 16, Sept. 27, 1991, as modified by
Sentencia No. C-134(94; Decreto 306 de 1992 (Feb. 19, 1992). According to Dean Cepeda,
those working on the new constitution were aware of and wanted to avoid problems
associated with the state action doctrine under the U.S. Constitution. He explained that
the framers wanted the constitution to deal with the effects of power and that much of the
power in Colombia is private power. Consistent with this purpose, the tutela is not
available against all private action but is limited to specific situations involving power
differentials. Interview with Manuel Jos6 Cepeda, supra note 81.
97. In an early tutela opinion rejecting this limited view of fundamental rights, the
Court wrote, "[t]he fundamental character of a right is not dependent on the location of
the article that guarantees it within the text of the charter, but the criteria for
determining this quality must be one that is in obedience with a material conception that
flows from one's inheritance of human dignity." Sentencia No. T-615/92, cited in
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supplemented these rights through doctrines of derechos
fundamentales por conexidad (a nexus theory of defining when
social, economic, and cultural rights are deemed directly
enforceable fundamental rights) and of derecho al minimo vital
(the right to minimum conditions of material security).98 The
Court has also broadened the application of the tutela by
generously interpreting Article 86's requirement that rights be
"threatened," its requirement that no other judicial defense is
available, and its threshold showing of "irreparable prejudice"
when the tutela is sought as a temporary mechanism.99
Significantly, as mentioned above, the tutela is available
against certain private actions. The initial decree implementing
Article 86 enumerates nine instances in which tutelas could be
brought against private entities and individuals. Here, too, the
Court has interpreted the Constitutional provisions broadly. In a
March 17, 1994, opinion the Constitutional Court removed
restrictions on the type of fundamental rights that could be
asserted in such instances and reiterated its commitment to wide
application of the tutela by declaring:
[T]he action of tutela, by its nature, protects the integrity of
fundamental rights, and not just some of them, given that
human dignity is unitary and indivisible. Therefore, its
protection must be full, total, and integral....
[Ilf, as is determined, the action of tutela lies to protect the
fundamental rights of people, then it is not logical to realize a
differentiation with respect to which rights can be protected
and which cannot. It is worth reiterating that this
Corporation has already determined that the mechanism
consecrated in constitutional Article 86 is applicable to all
fundamental rights, that is, those that are found consecrated
in the Constitution, those that are determined by
international treaties (art. 94, C.P. [Political Constitution]),
and those that the Constitutional Court recognizes while
DESARROLLO JURISPRUDENCIAL DE LA CONSTITUCION POLfTICA, supra note 82, at 104.
98. See Cifuentes, supra note 7, at 114-22.
99. See DESARROLLO JURISPRUDENCIAL DE LA CONSTITUCI6N POLUTICA, supra note
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realizing its corresponding review of tutela rulings, having in
consideration the nature of law and the concrete case .... 100
The second important judicial protection of constitutional
rights is the acci6n plblica, or public action, of
unconstitutionality. As Article 40 of the Constitution mandates,
any citizen, regardless of whether one has any personal injury or
stake in the controversy, can bring this action.' A citizen may
"interpose public actions in defense of the Constitution and the
law.""2 The Constitution authorizes the Constitutional Court "to
decide on petitions of unconstitutionality that citizens present
against laws, both for their substantive content and for
procedural errors in their formation."..
Previously within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the
action has taken on added significance now that it is entrusted to
a separate and independent Constitutional Court. Justice Arango
describes the public action of unconstitutionality as one of the
world's broadest. For example, there is no standing requirement
as one finds in the United States. As Justice Arango explains:
"the only requirement for presenting an action of
unconstitutionality is to be a Colombian national and be over
eighteen years old and not have lost citizenship rights.... All
Colombian citizens can complain, independently of whether the
law they challenge causes them problems or not."'°4
Moreover, the parties to the action are not the only ones
governed by the Constitutional Court's decisions. As Article 243
of the Constitution states: "The fallos (rulings) that the Court
dictates in the exercise of its jurisdictional control become cosa
juzgada constitucional.' Rulings invalidating laws in public
actions of unconstitutionality are obligatory or binding.
Previously, the Supreme Court had exercised a final power of
100. Sentencia No. C-134194, discussed in addendum to Pedro Pablo Camargo, supra
note 88. According to Camargo, Mexico and other Latin American countries that have
procedures similar to the tutela in some respects do not provide for their use against
private entities or individuals. The exceptions he notes are under Costa Rica's amparo
and, in exceptional cases, under the Brazilian mandado de seguranqa. Id. at 207.
101. CONST. POL. COL. art. 40(6): "Every citizen has the right to participate in the
formation, exercise, and control of political power. To make this right effective, one can:
(6) Interpose public actions in defense of the Constitution and the law."
102. Id.
103. CONST. POL. COL. art. 241(4).
104. Interview with Jorge Arango Mejfa, supra note 94.
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judicial review in such cases; the 1991 Constitution places this
power in the hands of the Constitutional Court105
Although formally tutela rulings are binding only on the
parties, as a practical matter, the effects of tutela decisions
extend further for several reasons. First, the Constitutional
Court recieves all tutela decisions and can exercise its
discretionary power to review and reverse any that depart from
its decisions in prior tutela cases. Second, the Court has applied
Article 13's equality principle to the judiciary by requiring that
justices either treat later similar cases equally or state the
reasons for their departures.' 7 Additionally, the Court has
created a concept somewhat like the class action in U.S. law
whereby it designates a case presenting systemic constitutional
violations as an estado de cosas inconstitucionales (literally, a
state of unconstitutional things) and issues orders that are
applicable beyond the parties to the case."'
Unification of constitutional jurisprudence is an important
guiding consideration, and the Court has lamented that the older
courts have not fully accepted the changes in the structure of the
judicial system wrought by the new Constitution. Justice
Eduardo Cifuentes Mufioz explains this phenomenon and notes
that it is not unique to Colombia:
105. Cepeda, supra note 6, at 85.
106. The law regulating the Constitutional Court's tutela jurisdiction provides that
its tutela rulings have effects only between the parties. L.E. 270/96, art. 48; see also
Decreto 2592 de 1991, art 36. Article 230 of the Constitution reflects the traditional civil
law view that judges only apply the law and do not make law, stating that "equity,
jurisprudence, general principles of law and doctrine are auxiliary criteria." Under a
1887 law, modified in 1896, Colombia recognized that three uniform decisions by the
Supreme Court on the same point of law constitute doctrina probable that judges should
apply in analogous cases. See Nagle, supra note 5, at 78. An early decree stating that the
constitutional doctrine established by the Court was "obligatory" auxiliary authority,
Decreto 2067 de 1991, art. 23, led to early panel decisions treating doctrine established in
tutelas as having general obligatory effects. See Jos9 VICENTE & BARRETO RODRIGUEZ,
ACCION DE TUTELA, TEORIA Y PRACTICA, 384-85, 422-25 (2d ed. 1998). In a 1993 decision,
the Constitutional Court ruled that the portion of the early decree according to
.obligatory" status to constitutional doctrine was unconstitutional. Sentencia No. C-
131193.
107. Interview with Eduardo Ciffuentes Mufioz, Magistrado of the Colombian
Constitutional Court, Bogotd, Colombia (Dec. 11, 1998). See, e.g., Sentencia No. T-321/98.
108. Id. Interview with Rodrigo Uprinmy, Magistrado Auxilar, Bogota, Colombia
(Dec. 14, 1998). See, e.g., Sentencia No. T-153/98, Estado de cosas inconstitucional en los
Centros de Reclusi6n del Pais (ordering systemic changes in prison conditions throughout
the country).
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In the abstract, it seems that no judicial official disputes that
the [prevailing order] gives the Constitutional Court the
authority to unify the constitutional jurisprudence (C.P.,
articulo 241).... However, for sociological reasons related to
the constitutional transformation, at the moment of resolving
concrete cases, the older tribunals, whose primacy was
indisputable in the prior constitutional order, refuse to adapt
to the constitutional change, and thus to recognize the
superior competency that the Charter gives the Constitutional
Court in the matter of the tutela action. This phenomenon is
not exclusive to our country, but has been presented in all
those States that, in the second half of the present century,
have changed, in a substantial form, their constitutional
structure of judicial power. However, the truth is that in
these States, sooner rather than later, the highest tribunals
adapt to the constitutional changes, which in our country, it
seems, still has not happened.0 9
To summarize, the new Constitution's extensive recognition
of both positive and negative substantive rights and the
Constitutional Court's broad jurisdiction and responsibility for
safeguarding fundamental rights provide the backdrop for the
emerging gender jurisprudence described in the following section.
III. THE EMERGING GENDER JURISPRUDENCE, 1992 - 1998
A. Domestic Violence
In a society characterized by violence, one of the first uses of
tutelas by Colombian women was as a means of seeking
protection against violence in their homes.11° A 1990 survey
109. Sentencia No. T-008/98. This opinion by Justice Eduardo Cifuentes Mufioz also
discusses the Constitutional Court's understanding that tutelas may be brought against
judicial decisions if the case involves a vla de hecho-a decision that is so far outside the
judicial function, in one of several ways, that it cannot be classified as a judicial act-that
affects fundamental constitutional rights, and the other requirements for granting a
tutela are met. The Court earlier invalidated portions of the initial decree regulating
tutela actions against judicial decisions. See Sentencia No. C-543/92.
110. For a more in-depth discussion of the Court's jurisprudence on domestic violence,
see Isabel Cristina Jaramillo S., El "hogar," ,espacio privado o piblico? in DERECHO
CONSTITUCIONAL: PERSPECTIVAS CRiTICAS (Manuel J. Cepeda, et al. eds., 1999) (on file
with the Inter-American Law Review).
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indicated that 58% of women who had been in formal or de facto
marriages had been physically or psychologically abused by their
partners. Women quickly began using tutelas to obtain orders
against physical or psychological abuse by husbands or
companions.111 As previously noted tutelas can be filed not only
against public authorities (and against private entities that
provide public services or that seriously and directly affect the
common interest) but also against private persons with respect to
whom the petitioner is in a position of subordination or
vulnerability. The Constitutional Court has recognized that
physical or psychological violence against women violates their
fundamental rights to personal integrity," health, and life."'
And, while the relief in a tutela action generally is an order
directing or prohibiting certain actions, fines and jail sentences
may be imposed for noncompliance with such orders."4 Thus,
husbands could be sent to jail for continuing to abuse their wives
after being ordered to stop.
The Constitutional Court's first tutela decision granting
protection to a victim of spousal abuse was released on
September 18, 1992." 5 The action was filed on behalf of Blanca
Cecilia Castro Lopez against her husband Gustavo Cirdenas,
alleging he had subjected her to severe physical violence and
threats, in public and private, including attacking her with a
machete. The lower courts ruled that tutelas did not cover
domestic abuse and that, in any event, her own actions showed
that other remedies including separation or seeking police
assistance were available. "
Instead of opting to affirm this conservative approach, the
Constitutional Court reversed on the grounds that domestic
abuse in this case constituted a denial of the fundamental
constitutional rights to life and physical integrity under Articles
11 and 12 and of domestic peace between spouses based in
111. See, e.g., Sentencia No. T-529/92; Sentencia No. T-382/94; Sentencia No. T-
487/94; Sentencia No. T-552/94.
112. See CONST. POL. COL. art. 12. See, e.g., Sentencia No. T-529192.
113. See CONST. POL. COL. art. 11. See, e.g., Sentencia No. T-529/92.
114. Article 52 of Decree 2591 of 1991 on desacato (contempt) provides that
disobeying a judicial order in a tutela action is punishable by up to six months arresto and
a fine of up to twenty times the minimum monthly salary, without prejudice to other
applicable penal sanctions.
115. See Sentencia No. T-529/92.
116. Id.
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Articles 42 and 43. The opinion of Justice Fabio Mor6n Diaz
illustrates the Court's broad reading of these constitutional
guarantees. He couched protection against domestic violence as
within "one of the fundamentals of all democratic-liberal
constitutional legal systems"-"the disposition of their public
authority to assure its members respect for their lives and
goods," a "doctrinaire presupposition [without which a] society
does not have a Constitution."" ' Dfaz further stated that
respect for the life and physical integrity of others, in a broad
moral and legal sense, cannot be reduced to only the police
protection or the criminal punishment of the aggressor, it
includes the duty neither to abuse, nor offend, nor torture, nor
threaten people, much less one with whom one shares a
domestic union of procreation and development of children
and the family, and the promise of mutual material and
spiritual fostering."8
With this decision, the Court demonstrated that it would
interpret the rights enumerated in the new constitution with an
eye toward imposing "special considerations fundamentally
related to the highest social values and with the full dignity of
the natural person without any distinction."
119
The judicial activism represented by this case and others
helped spur a legislative response, in the form of a new law
aimed at protecting women against spousal abuse. In July 1996,
acting to comply with Article 42's direction that "[alli forms of
violence in the family shall be considered destructive of its
harmony and unity and shall be sanctioned according to the law,"
Congress enacted, for the first time, domestic violence
legislation. 1' ° The law established a penalty of one to two years in
prison for physical, psychological, or sexual abuse of any member
of the nuclear family.'
12
In a further step demonstrating the interaction between the
judicial and the legislative processes, the Constitutional Court
had an opportunity to review the constitutionality of this new
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Sentencia No. T-529/92.
120. Ley de Violencia Intrafamiliar, Ley 294/96.
121. Id.
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
law.122 By means of a public action, Gloria Guzm6n Duque
challenged the constitutionality of two of this law's provisions:
Article 22 (Intra-familial Violence) and Article 25 (Sexual
Violence Between Spouses).12 Her complaint alleged that these
articles violated Article 42 and Article 44 (rights of children) of
the Constitution because of their lenient treatment of family
violence.'24
On June 5, 1997, the Constitutional Court rejected the
challenges to Article 22, which established a penalty of one to two
years in prison for physical, psychological, or sexual abuse of any
member of the nuclear family.12 ' The Court ruled that this
provision was constitutional because it established a separate
new offense and did not preclude application of the more severe
punishment prescribed for other established offenses if their
elements are established.1 2 ' The Court, however, found that
Article 25 violated the constitutional right to equality in that the
law provided more lenient penalties for interspousal rape than
for other forms of rape. 7  The Court recognized that civil
marriage does impose additional duties, but "personhood is not
alienated or transferred."12 Thus, the woman does not lose her
individual personhood, nor is her "sexual liberty.. .considered
diminished."' 
2 9
The adoption of the law on Intra-familial Violence, in turn,
prompted the Court to rule that tutelas could no longer be used to
redress domestic violence because there now is an alternative
available judicial procedure that affords immediate protection for
victims of intra-familial violence.' Many lower courts have
122. Justice Cifuentes has pointed to the intra-familial violence law as an example of
positive interaction between the Constitutional Court and Congress. He described the
new law as a response to the Court's tutela jurisprudence involving domestic abuse.
Interview with Eduardo Cifuentes Mufioz (Dec. 11, 1998), supra note 107.
123. Sentencia No. C-285/97.
124. While Jacquin de Samper, wife of then President Samper, blamed the new law
with contributing more to the disintegration of the family than to family unity and led a
campaign to reform the law to make it less punitive and more rehabilitative, others
believed the new law was too lenient. Menos Punitiva y Mas Rehabilitadora, 193
MUJER/FEMPRESS (Santiago), Nov. 1997, at 20.
125. Sentencia No. C285/97.
126. Sentencia No. C285/97.
127. Id., citing CONST. POL. COL. art. 13.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Interview with Eduardo Cifuentes Muioz (Dec. 11, 1998), supra note 107. See,
e.g., Sentencia No.T-420/96.
[Vol. 30:2
1999] COLOMBIAN GENDER JURISPRUDENCE 285
reacted negatively to the new law, however, and some judges
have proposed "dejudicializing" domestic violence.' 3' Such a
response has raised the question of whether domestic violence is
redressable through these legal remedies. As Justice Cifuentes
has stated, the Court might find it necessary to reopen the door
to tutela actions against domestic violence if the new law is not
faithfully implemented."
32
B. Sexual and Reproductive Rights
1. Pregnancy and Maternity Rights
Colombian women also have used tutelas to raise issues of
reproductive freedom. For example, teenage mothers brought
some of the first such actions, successfully obtaining orders
regaining admission to high schools after becoming pregnant.133
The Court based its rulings in these cases on the new
Constitution's protections against discrimination and on its
protection of human dignity and the free development of
personality,"' as well as on its declaration of a right to
education 35 and its special protection of pregnant women.
Despite numerous rulings in favor of pregnant teenagers and
teenage mothers, such young women continue to confront
negative cultural attitudes in schools. On September 21, 1998,
the Court granted a tutela on behalf of pregnant students and
students in uniones de hecho, or de facto marriages, who were
forced to wear red aprons or pinafores.'37 The Court ruled that
the school's practices violated rights of the family as the basic
institution of society, as well as rights to equal protection, and to
the free development of one's personality.3 ' Similarly, on
131. Interview with Maria Isabel Plata, supra note 4.
132. Interview with Eduardo Cifuentes Mufioz (Dec. 11, 1998), supra note 107.
133. See, e.g., Sentencia No. T-420/92; Sentencia No. T-292f94.
134. CONST. POL. COL. art. 16.
135. CONST. POL. COL, arts. 44, 67.
136. CONST. POL. COL. art. 43: "...During pregnancy and after birth women will enjoy
special assistance and protection of the state, and will receive support subsidies from it if
they then become unemployed or abandoned."
137. Sentencia No. T-516/98. See Adriana Palacio Garc~s, Damaris ya no es la chica
de rojo, EL TIEMPO (Bogota), Sept. 24, 1998.
138. Sentencia No. T-516/98.
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November 11, 1998, the Court granted a tutela against a school
in Cali that refused to permit a pregnant sixteen-year-old to
attend regularly scheduled classes contending that she could
"contaminate" other students and lead them down a "bad path."'39
In the employment context, the Court has afforded
protection to pregnant workers by recognizing a concept of fuero
de maternidad (analogous to the longstanding concept of fuero
syndical that protects the job security of union activists) to
protect against loss of employment for reasons related to
pregnancy.40 In September 1997, the Court ruled that women
workers cannot be dismissed from their jobs without cause
during pregnancy or within the first three months after giving
birth and that employers who unlawfully terminate an employee
during these periods are not only obligated to pay the employee
sixty days' salary as provided in Article 239 of the labor code but
also must reinstate all employment rights.14 1 Justice Alejandro
Martinez Caballero's opinion relied on Articles 13 and 43 and on
Article 53's recognition of special protection for women,
maternity, and minor workers as fundamental principles that
must be taken into account in labor legislation to supplement or
modify Article 239 to deny all effect to such unlawful
terminations. 141
139. Sentencia No. T-656/98.
140. Interview with Catalina Botero, Magistrada Auxiliar, Bogotd, Colombia (Dec. 16,
1998).
141. Sentencia No. C-470/97. The Court earlier had stopped short of declaring such a
right to reinstatement. See Sentencia No. C-710/96.
142. Sentencia No. C-470/97. Justice Antonio Barrera Carbonell defends the Court's
use of such "conditional" or "modulating" decisions against charges that judges are
legislating: "What is worse: to destroy the work of the legislator or to save it? Making
[such modifications] is a type of harmonious collaboration between powers." Interview
with Antonio Barrera Carbonell, Magistrado of the Colombian Constitutional Court,
BogotA, Colombia (Dec. 11, 1998). For other opinions dealing with pregnancy and
maternity rights in the workplace and recognizing that the Constitution and international
conventions guarantee special protection for pregnant and nursing employees, see, for
example, Sentencias Nos. T-568/96; C-710/96. Although the tutela is generally not
available to seek reinstatement because of the availability of other means of judicial relief
under labor laws, an exception exists in cases of pregnant workers; the tutela may be used
as a transitory mechanism to prevent irreparable injury when reinstatement is required
to assure the minimum necessities of life (el mtnimo vital) for a mother or her newborn.
Sentencias Nos.T-606/95; T-311/96; T-373/98; T-426/98. [Note also the recent Sentencia
No. C-199/99 (upholding a provision of the 1998 civil service law that governs benefits due
pregnant civil service workers in lay offs, as conditioned on the Court's broad
interpretation of the phrase "compensation entitled to.").]
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In announcing the Court's decision, the Bogotd newspaper El
Tiempo noted that, in Bogoti alone, an average of four women
workers a day are fired from their jobs because they are
pregnant."' A leader of one women's rights organization, Olga
Amparo Sinchez G6mez, Director of Equality for Women, praised
the Court's opinion, telling the press that "[tlo have a child
should not be an obstacle to working. These barriers must begin
to be torn down, because in Colombia to be a mother seems a
punishment."44
In an earlier case involving social security coverage, the
Court ruled against Avianca Airlines in a tutela action brought
by a copilot denied health care coverage for a miscarriage on the
grounds that it was not an illness. The Court found violations of
fundamental rights related to health, procreation, irrevocable
social security protections for maternity, and personal integrity.
It characterized the decision to deny coverage as "a
discrimination based on the woman's role in procreation.
" 145
2. Sex Education
Another issue the Constitutional Court addressed early on
was sex education. Justice Cifuentes has explained his view of
the need for sex education to remove the taboo about sexuality,
noting that "ignorance and prejudice, in part, explain the
subordinate position that some wrongly assign to women."'46 In
1992, the Court considered whether a teacher's fundamental
rights were violated when she was fired for teaching sex
education to her third grade class.147  An opinion by Justice
Cifuentes in a tutela action by Lucila Diaz Diaz found that
academic freedom was a fundamental personal right and that
teachers could not be punished for teaching sexual education in
class, because it was not unreasonable but rather was intended
to help lower the number of undesired pregnancies, reduce
sexually transmitted diseases, and reduce irresponsible
parenthood.' The Court also directed the Minister of Education
143. No a despido de embarazadas: Corte, EL TIEMPO (Bogota), Sept. 26, 1997.
144. Id.
145. Sentencia No.T-341/94.
146. Cifuentes, supra note 60.
147. Sentencia No. T-440/92.
148. Id.
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to engage experts to study the best content and methodology for
teaching sex education and to order whatever changes or
modifications necessary to ensure that schools throughout the
country conform to the experts' recommendations within twelve
months after receiving their report.'4
3. Women Prisoners
The Constitutional Court has also approved use of the tutela
to protect the reproductive rights of women prisoners. In 1993,
the Court granted an order against the enforcement of prison
regulations requiring female prisoners to be fitted with an IUD
or take contraceptives as a condition of conjugal visits when male
prisoners were not subjected to any similar requirements. 150 The
Court had earlier concluded that an incarcerated person's right
to conjugal visits was a limited fundamental right, dependent
upon the capacity of the facility to accommodate such visits. 51
Attorney Blanca Amelia Medina Torres, who was a pre-trial
detainee in The Good Shepard Women's Detention Center in
Bogotd, filed a tutela challenging regulations and practices
requiring that women inmates who desire conjugal visits take sex
education courses and either show they were incapable of
conceiving or be fitted with an IUD or take contraceptives. The
warden of the prison defended the regulations, arguing that
Medina Torres would try to get pregnant to escape punishment.
The court said that this assumption violated Article 83 of the
Colombian Constitution, which requires public authorities to
presume the good faith of individuals in all actions that come
before them. According to the Court, the unequal treatment of
women prisoners constituted sex discrimination in violation of
Article 13, violated reproductive and family rights provisions of
Articles 42 ("[tlhe couple has the right to decide freely and
responsibly the number of their children") and 43 ("[d]uring
149. Id. See also Educacidn sexual es una obligacidn, EL TIEMPO (BogotA), Aug. 18,
1997. Dean Cepeda pointed to this case to illustrate difficulties in ensuring effective
implementation of judicial opinions. Although the Minister of Education complied with
the Court's order to prepare a national plan for sex education, the Court's order did not
ensure that the plan would be of high quality or effectively implemented. Interview with
Manuel Jos6 Cepeda, supra note 81.
150. Sentencia No. T-222/93.
151. Id. The court also charged the state to equip all detention facilities to permit
conjugal visits.
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pregnancy and after birth, women will enjoy special assistance
and protection of the state") as well as similar provisions in
international human rights documents incorporated in the
Constitution (including the U.N. Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women)," 2 and violated
the right under Article 16 to the development of one's personality
through the exercise of responsible parenthood.1 3
4. Abortion
Not surprisingly in this overwhelmingly Catholic country,
another reproductive freedom issue has met with less success in
the Constitutional Court. In 1994, a majority of the
Constitutional Court rejected a direct constitutional challenge to
the country's strict criminal abortion law."4
Over objections of three dissenting justices, the Court upheld
the law as a protection of the right to life.' Justice Antonio
Barrera Carbonell wrote the Court's opinion rejecting arguments
that Article 343 violated the Constitution's recognition of a
152. The opinion cited the text of the Convention's Preamble to the effect that
'women's role in procreation must not be a reason for discrimination," and to its Article 16
which embraces the same right as Article 43 of the Colombian Constitution. Sentencia No.
T-273/93. It also found violations of Article 11 of the American Convention on Human
Rights (the San Jos6 Pact) ("Nobody shall be the object of arbitrary or abusive
interferences in their private lives, in that of their family, in their home and
correspondence, nor to illegal attacks on their honor or reputation.") American
Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Official records OEAISer.K/XVJI1.1,
Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 1 of Jan. 7, 1970, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 99, 105 (1970), and the
similar provision in Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 177.
153. Sentencia No. T-273/93. The Court has also protected the rights of women, but
not men, in prison to care for their young children. See OBSERVATORIO LEGAL DE LA
MUJER,EL LEGADO DE LA CONSTITUCION 52 (Cristina Motta ed., 1998) (comparing
Sentencias Nos. T-437/93 and T-598/93 with Sentencia No. T-277/94).
154. Sentencia No. C-133/94. Article 343 of the penal code provides: "A woman who
causes her abortion or permits another to cause it, will incur imprisonment for from one
(1) to three (3) years." The penal code recognizes no exceptions for therapeutic abortions.
For further discussion of this case, see Reed Boland, Population Policies, Human Rights,
and Legal Change, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1257, 1266-68 (1995).
For discussion of the Constituent Assembly's rejection of proposals from both
sides of the abortion debate that the new Constitution expressly address abortion-either
by guaranteeing the right to abortion (or free motherhood) or by defining life as beginning
at conception-see, Morgan, Constitution-Making, supra note 1, at 388-96. See also
CEPEDA, supra note 79, at 54.
155. CONST. POL. COL. art. 11.
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couple's right to decide their number of children'56 or the
constitutional guarantees of women's rights to equal protection,...
to personal and family privacy," and to the free development of
their personality. In closing, the majority did suggest a role for
the legislature in resolving possible conflicting rights of women
and the unborn.
We do not discard the possibility of eventual conflicts between
the fundamental right of a pregnant woman and the rights of
the unborn; but in the court's judgment it is not its mission
but the task of the legislature to design criminal policy
through the adoption of rules that contribute to the solution of
such conflicts.'o
Justice Eduardo Cifuentes Mufioz wrote a dissenting opinion
joined by Justices Carlos Gaviria Diaz and Alejandro Martinez
Caballero. For the dissenters, the penal code's absolute
criminalization of all abortion violated the procreative autonomy
that was part of the constitution's protection of the right of
parents to decide the number of children they want to have
(Article 42) and of the right to free development of one's
personality (Article 16). Their opinion referred to the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade,16' and echoed its
reasoning in some respects. 6' The dissent objected to recognizing
legal personhood of a fetus and placed little weight on the
constitutional assembly's rejection of proposals to guarantee a
right to abortion. The dissenters criticized the Court's double
standards regarding abortions:
156. CONST. POL. COL. art. 42.
157. CONST. POL. COL. art. 13.
158. CONST. POL. COL. art. 15.
159. CONST. POL. COL. art. 16.
160. Sentencia No. C-133/94. Justice Barrera emphasized this last portion of the
opinion when questioned about his decision in this case. Interview with Antonio Barrera
Carbonell, supra note 142. Justice Jos6 Gregoric Hernndez, who joined the majority
opinion, also explained his view that Congress-but not the court-could depenalize
abortion. Interview with Jos6 Gregorio Herndndez, Magistrado of the Colombian
Constitutional Court, Bogotd, Colombia (Dec. 15, 1998).
161. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe was modified in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
162. "The protection of the unborn, according to the different periods of its
development and its relative weight in comparison with the rights of the persons involved,
in particular the pregnant woman-a solution that is graduated or by periods-allows
avoiding an 'all or nothing' decision, that disregards fundamental rights." Salvamento de
Voto, Sentencia C-133/94.
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It does not escape the magistrates who sign this dissenting
opinion that the society and the State work with a double
moral [standard] of being complacent and accepting the
impunity of abortion but at the same time pretending to cover
this activity with a drastic and absolute formal penalization of
said conduct, knowing that women, bereft of support, will see
themselves forced by insurmountable circumstances-rape,
incest, deformities, danger to the health or life of the mother-
to make the decision to abort, justified by hopes of a life of
dignity.
163
On January 23, 1997, a day after the twenty-forth
anniversary of Roe v. Wade,"M the Colombian Constitutional
Court again addressed the abortion issue. The case was an
action of unconstitutionality filed by Jos6 Euripides Parra
challenging the provisions of the penal code that provide criminal
penalties for abortions in cases of pregnancies resulting from
rape or involuntary insemination. 16 Article 345 of the penal code
provides that "[a] woman pregnant as a result of violent or
abusive carnal access or nonconsensual artificial insemination
who causes her own abortion or permits another to cause it, will
incur arresto of from four (4) months to one (1) year."6" The
Court rejected the challenger's demand that it invalidate the
code's recognition of "lesser" penalties in these cases and instead
establish as uniformly applicable the even harsher penalties
provided for other abortions." s  The majority upheld the
legislative judgment about the appropriate severity of the
penalty for abortions in such "attenuating circumstances."'69 But
the five justices joining the main opinion once again expressed
their views about abortion as an attack on human life, which
they saw as beginning with conception. Their opinion included
parts of papal encyclicals by Pope Paul VI and Pope John Paul
1i.170
163. Id.
164. Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
165. Sentencia No. C-013/97.
166. Id.
167. COD. PEN. COL. art. 345.
168. Sentencia No. C-013/97.
169. Id.
170. Sentencia No. C-013/97. The court also rejected the action's challenge to Articles
347 and 348 of the penal code which provide lesser penalties for abandoning, abusing or
killing a minor under such circumstances (provided the act occurs within eight days of the
child's birth). COD. PEN. COL. arts. 347 & 348.
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Four justices joined separate opinions expressing their
differing views on this matter. Justice Jorge Arango Mejfa
objected to the use of the papal encyclicals and made it clear that
he believed that Congress could decriminalize abortion without
running afoul of the new constitution. "' Three justices went
further, joining an opinion objecting to the majority's handling of
the matter altogether. Justices Eduardo Cifuentes Mufloz, Carlos
Gaviria Diaz, and Alejandro Martinez Caballero rejected
arguments that this was a matter for determination by the
legislative processes.
There are decisions [with respect to] which the weight of the
majority gives them sufficient legitimacy and once adopted
bind everyone without exception. However, there are matters
and subjects which, like the one under analysis, pertain to the
private and moral sphere of the person and whose definition is
outside the democratic processes.
The woman who is a victim of sexual aggression is confronted
with a tragic decision: Preserve the fruit of a criminal
pregnancy and assume the consequences derived from this,
which carries a reduction or substantial loss of her rights of
self-determination, or expel the fetus in her womb through a
nonconsensual invasion of her intimacy and affirm
consequently, her right to her own body and liberty.... A
woman who in these circumstances has an abortion does
nothing more than an act of legitimate defense and now that it
has been established that this is legally denied to her, it is
equivalent to establishing an extraordinarily onerous
burden. 172
These three justices argued that it violated the constitution
to impose criminal penalties on abortions by women who are
pregnant because of rape or involuntary artificial insemination.
They accused the justices in the majority of imposing their own
moral and religious prejudices.7 '
Calling the majority's rhetoric "sexist and patriarchal," these
justices concluded:
171. Aclaraci6n de voto a la Sentencia No. C-013/97.
172. Salvamento de voto a la Sentencia No. C-013/97.
173. Id.
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The price that the Court has paid by assuming one moral
position, of the various that are present in Colombian society,
making this its own, and deciding the constitutionality of a
law on this basis, could not be higher: it has lost its
impartiality and ceased ruling according to law.11
4
In October 1998, legislators from throughout Latin America
gathered in Bogotd for a university sponsored conference on the
medical, religious, ethical, statistical, and social aspects of
abortion."5 Media coverage of the conference underscored the
current contours of the problem,7 ' noting that today abortions
are eight times more frequent than ten years ago. The latest
studies show that in Colombia one in three women who have
been pregnant have had an abortion.'77 Twenty-six of every 100
women attending the country's universities have had an
abortion. Of every 100 women who have abortions, twenty-nine
suffer complications, eighteen of which are very serious.
Legislators attending the conference sponsored by Externado
University expressed their concern about the position of the
Catholic Church, urging that it "must be more flexible in regards
to its conception of abortion and must be willing to analyze the
typical social reality of our women."'78 Despite the alarming
statistics and the call for more flexibility, in December 1998, the
Colombian Senate rejected proposals to depenalize or lessen the
penalties for abortion in certain instances, including cases of
rape.
174. Id.
175. Aborto: otra 'moda' en la U., EL TIEMPO (Bogotd), Oct. 9, 1998.
176. Id. See generally M6nica Maria Alzate, Free Motherhood in Colombia: Between
the Catholic Church and the Law, Thesis for Master of Arts Degree in Women Studies,
University of Alabama, 1993 (manuscript on file with author).
177. Aborto: otra 'moda'en la U., supra note 175.
178. Id.
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5. Sexual Orientation 179
Sexual autonomy or freedom from universalist or culturally
predefined roles of sexual orientation is a critical aspect of the
global gender justice agenda.90 In Latin America, machismo
incorporates a particularly virulent, if complex, strain of
homophobia.' In 1991, Colombian gays and lesbians were still
overwhelmingly closeted and did not openly participate in the
constitutional process. In the intervening years some members
of this community have emerged to invoke the new
Constitutional Court's protection under the new charter.
The Constitutional Court confronted one aspect of this
controversial issue in 1994 when it selected for review a tutela
filed by a young man who had been refused admission to military
school based on his homosexuality.1 In the face of strong
Colombian moral and religious sentiments against
homosexuality, a panel of the Court ruled that he must be
admitted.' The Court found that exclusion from military schools
179. I prefer to use the term sexual orientation to describe the diverse universe of
manifestations of consensual adult sexuality and to refer to persons who are gay, lesbian,
bisexual, or transgendered as such, rather than to use the problematic terms
"homosexuality" and "homosexuals." However, these terms have been used at times by
the court and some of the others quoted here and I also will use them at times in talking
about these cases.
180. See Julie Dorf & Gloria Careaga Pdrez, Discrimination and the Tolerance of
Difference: International Lesbian Human Rights, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995). See
also Laurence Hefer & Alice M. Miller, Sexual Orientation and Human Rights: Toward a
United States and Transnational Jurisprudence, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 61, n.135 (1996)
(the authors note the struggle for recognition of lesbianism in the United Nations Fourth
World Conference on Women Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. U.N. Doc.
A/CONE 177/20 (1995)). Compare Andrew Koppleman, Why Discrimination Against
Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 197 (1994).
181. For example, until recently, it was traditional in much of Latin America to
stigmatize only the so-called "passive" partner in male same-sex sexual activity. The
penetrator's actions were not viewed as inconsistent with the power dynamics of
machismo. See generally ROGER N. LANCASTER, LIFE IS HARD: MACHISMO, DANGER, AND
THE INTIMACY OF POWER IN NICARAGUA 235-78 (1992). See also Morgan, supra note 44, at
460. The same selective "stigmatization" characterized the classical Athenians according
to K.J. Dover. KENNETH JAMES DOVER, GREEK HOMOSEXUALITY (1989).
182. Sentencia No. T-097/94.
183. Id. For a comparative perspective on how sexual orientation issues have been
dealt with by other Latin American judiciaries, see the discussion of the Argentine
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Argentine Constitution Article 19's guarantee of
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and institutions based on homosexuality violated the petitioner's
fundamental rights to due process, to his good name, and to
education. The decision relied on Article 16's guarantee of the
right to the free development of one's personality and Article 15's
guarantee of the right to intimacy and one's good name. Justice
Cifuentes, the author of the opinion, grounded the Court's
opinion in the "intent of the constitutional assembly.. .to raise to
the status of a fundamental right the liberty related to vital
choices and individual beliefs.""' Justice Cifuentes noted that the
assembly "emphasized the liberal principle of no institutional
interference in subjective matters that do not constitute attempts
against social coexistence and organization." 5' The opinion
placed homosexuality "within this ambit of protection." The
opinion acknowledges that society as a whole had yet to embrace
the constitutional principles that the Court was enforcing:
[Although] the law has played an essential role in
transforming societal beliefs [about homosexuality], these still
are found lagging behind in relation to normative ideals. The
values of tolerance and pluralism, fully adopted by judicial
ordinance, must still overcome enormous obstacles in order to
be fully ensured in daily life.
86
The opinion distinguished between the status of
homosexuality and homosexual conduct, however, finding that
the latter, like other sexual conduct, could be prohibited within
the military. And the Court stated that military institutions were
entitled to demand discretion and silence concerning members'
sexual preferences." 7
personal autonomy, including the opinion in Comunidad Homosexual Argentina, see
Carlos S. Nino, On the Exercise of Judicial Review in Argentina, in TRANSITION TO
DEMOCRACY, THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY, supra note 16, at 322-25 (citing [1991-E] L.L.
679 (1991). In that case, the majority of the Argentine Court affirmed the decision of
lower tribunals upholding the government's refusal to grant legal personality to an
association of homosexuals. For discussion of the Nicaraguan Supreme Court's rejection
of a challenge to a penal code reform that criminalized inducing, promoting, or
propagandizing homosexual sodomy (Sentencia No. 18, Mar. 7, 1994), see Morgan, supra
note 44.
184. Sentencia No. T-097/94.
185. Sentencia No. T-097/94.
186. Id.
187. Id. The Court has subsequently revisited distinction between conduct and
status when it found discriminatory and unconstitutional a law that described
"homosexuality or the practice of sexual aberrations" as misconduct for which teachers
could be suspended or dismissed. See Sentencia No. C-481/98 and discussion infra at text
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Justice Cifuentes reflected on the opinion and the reaction it
caused:
Yes, I was the author of a decision of the tutela division where
we decided that within the armed forces there cannot be
discrimination against homosexuals in what has to do with,
the opinion refers basically to, sexual acts within the military.
Thus, the court ruled that for functional reasons, military
regulations could prohibit sexual relations-but homosexual
relations the same as heterosexual. Because obviously, it
could affect mental discipline, the good order within an
institution, if inside it sexual relations could take place. But
it would not be legal or constitutional only to proscribe or
prohibit homosexual relAtions. And, the Court indicated in
the opinion that there could not be discrimination for reasons
of sex and thus, except from the functional, institutional point
of view, there is no need to establish a prohibition like this of
sexual relations. The consideration of being homosexual must
not have any effect on anything having to do with access to
the army or one's service within the same....
Justice Cifuentes acknowledged that the decision provoked
disagreement within the three-justice panel that decided it, with
one of the justices dissenting from the ruling. Public reaction was
also divided, he said: "In the society in general, yes, it was the
object of much commentary where, well, it caused a certain
impact. I think in general terms it was not well received on the
accompanying notes 198-203. In February 1999, the Court was presented with a
challenge to Article 84 of Decreto 0085 of 1985, a provision of the Armed Forces
Disciplinary Code that prohibits homosexual acts (as well as notorious adultery and
association with drug addicts and prostitutes). See Debate con pudor en la Corte, EL
TIEMPO (Bogota), Feb. 21, 1999; Ejercito dice no a homaosexuales, EL TIEMPO (BogotA), Feb.
19, 1999.
[On July 14, 1999, the Court struck down parts of the Military Disciplinary Code,
including its treatment of being homosexual as a breach of honor and its prohibitions on
relations with homosexuals. The Court upheld the provision punishing public
homosexual acts by service members but on the condition that it apply to heterosexual
acts as well. Justice Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa wrote the opinion for the Court and stated
that openly revealing one's homosexuality or living with one's partner in houses on
military installations could not be grounds for dismissal from the service, nor could
displays of affection for one's partner outside the service. Prohibitions on adultery and
concubinage were also held unconstitutional. Sentencia No. C-507/99. See Si a
homosexuales, con discrecidn, EL TIEMPO (Bogoti), July 15, 1999; Homosexuales si pueden
estar in F.M., EL ESPECTADOR (Bogot,), July 15, 1999.]
188. Interview with Eduardo Cifuentes Mufioz (July 5, 1995), supra note 38.
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part of the military will, but also it was well received in other
sectors."189
Other tutelas have demonstrated the Court's willingness to
interpret Constitutional imperatives liberally. For example, in
ordering a Christian school to readmit gay students, the Court
said that excluding these students violated their rights to
education, to free development of their personality, and to
equality. 190 The Court even went so far as to place on the schools
responsibility for promoting tolerance among their students."'
Even with these broad readings of the Constitution, the
Court's cases dealing with gay rights are nonetheless grounded
in an individual rights regime. Dean Cepeda has observed that
the Court has refused to reckon with the institutional aspects of
the discrimination against gays and lesbians. 92 The tensions and
contradictions in the Court's jurisprudence dealing with sexual
orientation is illustrated by comparing two actions of
constitutionality in this area. First, in 1996, the Court
considered a constitutional challenge to a 1990 law that extended
legal rights to partners in permanent de facto marriages but only
covered such relationships between "a man and a woman."19
Justice Cifuentes wrote the opinion for the Court upholding the
law based on a finding that the law was designed to benefit a
group of women who had traditionally not been protected. 9 4 He
cited the traditional disadvantages women had suffered in such
relationships with men and their role in procreation as
differences that justified the special protection extended to
heterosexual partnerships.9 Speaking about this opinion later,
Justice Cifuentes expressed deference to the political arena, to
which gay rights' organizations could turn instead of simply
resorting to the judiciary by claiming protection under a law
designed to protect women concubines.196  In a separate
189. Id.
190. Sentencia No. T-100/98; Colegios no pueden excluir a homosexuales, EL TIEMPO
(Bogotd), Mar. 27, 1998.
191. Sentencia No. T-100/98.
192. Interview with Manuel Jos6 Cepeda, supra note 81.
193. Sentencia No. C-098/96. For further discussion of this case and of other
seemingly inconsistent cases from 1992-96 dealing with sexual orientation, see Cristina
Motta, La Corte Constitucional y los derechos de los homosexuales, in OBSERVATORIO DE
JUSTICIA CONSTITUCIONAL: BALANCE JURISPRUDENCIAL DE 1996, 290 (1998).
194. Sentencia No. C-098/96.
195. Id.
196. Interview with Eduardo Cifuentes Muftoz (Dec. 11, 1998), supra note 107.
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concurring opinion, Justices Cifuentes and Naranjo emphasized
that a law establishing legal recognition for homosexual unions
would be just and appropriate. The family was not a single
concept but an institution that has evolved and continues
evolving; the right to a family must follow course and be
respectful of pluralism and the right to free sexual choice.'97
In the second case, public school teacher Germdn Rinc6n
Perfitti challenged a provision of a 1979 law governing the
conduct of teachers listing "homosexuality or the practice of
sexual aberrations" as misconduct for which teachers could be
suspended or dismissed. He alleged that this provision in Article
46 of Decree 2277 violated the right to equality and the right to
work by impeding the right to freely choose one's profession.
On September 1, 1998, the Constitutional Court heard
presentations in the case. A lesbian teacher wore a black mask
as she stood before an overflowing courtroom and told the Court,
"I cover my face for fear of being punished for my sexual
orientation and of the discrimination that I could be subjected to
by the education community."' 9 Social scientists, representatives
of teachers organizations, and government officials also
presented their opinions to the Court. On the other side, the
representative of the Public Ministry supported the law but
argued it applied only when the teacher's behavior "transcends
into public life and constitutes a threat to the adequate
functioning of education." 199
One week later, on September 9, 1998, the Constitutional
Court ruled for the teacher by a vote of six to three.00 Magistrate
Alejandro Martfnez Caballero's opinion for the Court reviewed
the treatment of homosexuality as either a sin or an illness and
contained an extensive discussion of the contemporary debate
over whether sexual orientation is at least in part biologically
determined, is a matter of personal choice, or is socially
constructed. Acknowledging that it was not the Court's role to
197. Aclaraci6n de voto a la Sentencia No. C-098/96 (Cifuentes and Naranjo, JJ.).
Justices Hernando Herrera Vergara and Jos6 Gregorio Herndndez wrote concurring and
dissenting opinions, respectively. They stressed that Articles 42 and 43 of the
Constitution expressly refer to unions between men and women.
198. Maestros "gay"pasaron al estrado, EL TiEMPO (Bogoti), Sept. 2, 1998.
199. Id.
200. Sentencia No. C-481/98. See also Poencia favorable a profesores "gay," EL TIEMPO
(Bogotd), Sept. 9, 1998.
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resolve this debate, the opinion concluded that, in any event, the
law must be subjected to strict scrutiny. According to the
opinion, if sexual orientation is biologically determined,
discrimination on these grounds constitutes sex discrimination.
And if sexual preference is considered a matter of personal
choice, the law infringes on the fundamental right to the free
development of one's personality and thus is also subject to strict
scrutiny.
The Court found that the law was discriminatory in
considering homosexuality itself as reprehensible conduct.
Although warning that teachers may be sanctioned for conduct
that attempts to attack the sexual freedom of their students, the
majority questioned: "Why does the law not include men who
seduce their female students or women who seduce their male
students?"
The dissenting justices shared the view of the Procuraduria.
Justices Hernando Herrera Vergara, Jos6 Gregorio Herndndez
Galindo, and Alfredo Beltrdxn Sierra argued that the law did not
punish teachers for being homosexual but for conduct or sexual
insinuations that are carried out with students and advanced
their thesis that "the practice of homosexuality is conduct that
can be punished because really this goes against the rights of
children." They added that parents have the right to choose the
best education for their children.0' Justice Herndndez' dissent
referred to the saying in the fable of Pombo that "where there's
cheese, don't send cats," and invoked "popular wisdom" that "the
occasion makes the thief."°20 When questioned about this dissent,
Justice Herndndez pointed out that his views were those adopted
by the Court, but his dissent reflected his belief that many times
homosexuality is conditioned or acquired, not biologically
determined, and stated that for that reason he would not hand
over his eleven-year-old son to a teacher who was homosexual.02
Finally, to add a postscript to the discussion of same-sex
marriage, after several months of attempting to convince a
notary to perform the ceremony and prepare the written docu-
201. Endrgico salvamento, EL TIEMPO (Bogota), Sept. 10, 1998.
202. Salvamento de voto a ]a Sentencia No. C-481/98.
203. Interview with Josd Gregorio Herndndez, supra note 160.
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ment, on December 11, 1998, the first "gay marriage" having
legal effects was formalized before a notary in Bogotd. 24
6. Other Sexual Autonomy Issues
In September 1997, the Constitutional Court acknowledged
that to engage in prostitution and transvestism is part of the
constitutionally protected right to the free development of the
personality but nevertheless granted relief in a tutela action
brought by Herndin Villamil Camacho and his neighbors, who
sought to remove prostitutes and transvestites from a zone in
northern Bogotdi. The Court stressed that prostitution is not a
punishable offense but added that conduct can be limited when it
interferes with the fundamental rights of others to the free
development of their own personalities, to privacy, and to free
movement. The mayor and police authorities were ordered to
apply the Police Code provisions on public scandals and
harassment to maintain public order, personal security, and
conditions of morality in the zone. Justice Cifuentes wrote a
concurring opinion clarifying his vote by emphasizing the rights
to engage in prostitution and transvestism and expressing his
disagreement with the main opinion's reliance on the notion of
public order to justify granting relief to the neighbors."6
In August 1998, the Court unanimously rejected a challenge
to Article 259 of the penal code's treatment of incest as a crime
punishable by six months to four years imprisonment. 2 7  The
challenger, with the support of the President's Counsel for
Human Rights, had urged the Court to invalidate the
penalization of incest between consenting adults, arguing that it
violated the right to free and healthy sexuality.0 ' The Court
upheld the current law as justified by the State's duty to protect
204. Claudia Cer6n Coral, Una historia de amor y de leyes: y los declaro: 'marido' y
'marido,' EL TIEMPO (Bogotd), Dec. 13, 1998, at 22A. (A recent tutela decision has
grappled anew with the difficulty surrounding intersexuality. This case, from 1999, will
be on file with the Inter-American Law Review as soon as we receive it from the
Colombian Court via the author. See also Hermaphroditos in manos de medicos, EL
TIEMPO (Bogotd) May 14, 1999).
205. Sentencia No. SU-476/97; "Matricula condieional" a los travestidos, EL TIEMPO
(Bogoti), Sept. 26, 1997.
206. Aclaracion de voto a la Sentencia SU No. 476/97.
207. Sentencia No. C-404/98; Incesto no goza de hendicin judicial, EL TIEMPO
(Bogotd), Aug. 11, 1998.
208. Sentencia No. C-404198.
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the family. Although the main opinion, written by Justices
Eduardo Cifuentes and Carlos Gaviria, concluded that a penal
provision restricting personal liberty could not be justified solely
based on public morality, its lengthy discussion of the role of
moral arguments in constitutional adjudication provoked a
separate opinion. The opinion objected to the unnecessary
reliance on public morality, arguing that "in a pluralist society
like the Colombian, one must ask: 'Is there only one public
morality or are there several? And if there is only one, who
determines it? And if there are various, which has priority and
why?"'2 9 Justices Barrera, Martinez, and Gaviria also wrote a
second separate opinion stating their view that in cases between
consenting adults not living within a nuclear family, judges
should apply the requirement in Article 4 of the Penal Code that
for conduct to be punishable it must damage or threaten the legal
interest protected by the law.21
A recent proposal to reform the penal code would remove
incarceration as a penalty for incest between consenting adults
and replace it with a fine. Luz Nagle, a former judge on cases
involving incest between parents and children, discusses incest
and points out the special problems of rural Colombia:
This was a tough issue for me because when I was a judge
riding my circuit on horseback into very remote mountain
villages I sometimes had to deal with incest cases. These were
some of the most difficult cases I handled because the
peasants just couldn't understand how the laws against incest
could apply to them when 1) their peasant traditions for
generations dictated that children were a father's property to
do with as he pleased, and 2) they lived so far from the larger
societal notions of the rule of law that they could not conceive
that they were doing anything wrong in society. It was very
hard having to sentence someone to jail who truly did not
understand the reasons why he was being made accountable
for his behavior.21'
209. Aclaraci6n de voto a la Sentencia No. C-404/98.
210. Segunda aclaraci6n de voto a la Sentencia No. C-404/98.
211. Letter from Professor Luz Estella Nagle to author, supra note 28.
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C. Diverse Family Structures
Several of the Constitutional Court's decisions have dealt
with the Constitution's recognition of Colombia's diverse family
structures. As a result of factors such as war and other violence,
poverty, and high rates of teenage pregnancy, over 25% of
families are headed by single women. Women become heads of
families not because of changes in roles within the family as
much as because of changes in the status of men. 2 In addition,
according to a study completed in July 1998, by the National
Administrative Statistics Department (DANE), the number of
Colombian families living in uniones libres or uniones de facto
has increased from 10% in 1983 to 35% in 1998.3 The study also
reveals an increase in the number of widows, corresponding to an
increase in deaths, especially of men between twenty and forty-
four years old as a result of the intensification of the violence.
Article 43 of the Constitution states that "[tihe state shall
support the woman head of family in a special manner."2 14
Relying on this provision as well as on constitutional guarantees
of the right to work and due process, the Court granted a tutela
prohibiting municipal authorities from closing a small business
owned by a woman head of family.21 The tutela was filed by Rosa
Ana Orduz vda. (viuda or widow) de Bricefio after the authorities
revoked the permission they had granted her to run the family
blacksmith shop following her husband's death. She and her
oldest son were operating the shop out of the house she shared
with her three young children and eight other members of her
extended family. When the neighborhood grew and a residential
complex was built next to her house, some of the new residents
complained that the business disturbed them, and the authorities
ordered the business closed.
After finding violations of due process and labor rights,
Justice Carlos Gaviria Dfaz turned to Article 43's special
212. See ,Por que liega a serjefa de familia? MUJER/FEMPRESS (Santiago), Nov. 1998,
at 14 (reporting on recent research by the organizations Enda Amnrica Latina and Vamos
Mujer in Medellin which also pointed out the gender-bias in the current concept of head of
family that focuses on who is the principal economic provider, whose last name is used,
and who has decision-making power).
213. Socorro Ramfrez, Revoluci6n silenciosa, MUJER/FEMPRESS (Santiago), Oct. 1998.
214. CONST. POL. COL. art. 43.
215. Sentencia No. T-414/93.
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protection for women heads of family. According to Gaviria, the
authorities acted contrary to the estado social de derecho because
they did not assist "in a special manner a woman head of family,"
and, knowing that the death of her husband left her and her
children "in a desperate situation of helplessness," they made her
unemployed. 1 ' Gaviria also pointed out that the authorities'
action placed Orduz in a position where she could turn to the
State for subsidies rather than continue with her business, where
she was productively providing for herself and her children. 1'
In a case dealing with uniones de hecho, 218 the Court
protected the property rights of a woman upon the death of her
companion in a de facto union. It ruled that disregarding the
value of the woman's domestic work in acquiring and improving
the home where the couple had lived in favor of inheritance
rights of the man's sister and only heir violated the woman's
rights of equality and due process.219
The action was filed by Esther Varela who had lived with
Hernando Guerrero Trujillo for twenty-four years prior to his
death. For the last twenty-one years they had shared possession
of a house he bought in 1970. When he died in 1989, the courts
in Cali rejected Varela's claim that the value of her domestic
work should be considered in determining the rights to his
property. Instead the courts awarded the property to the
deceased's sister.
Justice Ciro Angarita's decision for the Constitutional Court
found for Varela. The Court announced that the constitutional
doctrine enunciated would have binding effect on authorities in
similar cases involving domestic work in relations between men
and women. Angarita's opinion demonstrates the Court's
sensitivity to the historical economic plight of women and the
Court's commitment to work toward the elimination of all forms
of discrimination against women:
Proceeding in this manner, the [Cali] Tribunal associated
itself with those who hold that domestic work is "invisible"
and as such, lacks all significance in the market economy.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See e.g., Juan Lozano, Extraha reforma, EL TIEMPO (BogotA), Sept. 28, 1998.
219. Sentencia No. T-494192.
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This Court can do nothing less than manifest its total
disagreement with this view because it encourages and
deepens the inequality and injustice in social relations, makes
economic development unequal, and damages the
fundamental rights of human beings.
[The opinion then cited national and international efforts
towards including the value of domestic work in economic
indicators and quoted from the work of Colombian Professors
Elssy Bonilla Castro and Penelope Rodriguez S. on the role
the social division of work plays in the subordination of
women.]
On the other hand, the constitutional assembly of 1991 was
aware not only of salary discrimination that Colombian
women are victims of today but also that many of them do not
receive any pay for their work. It was for this reason that
they elevated to the level of a constitutional canon the
elimination of all forms of discrimination against women and
220fully guaranteed their rights.
The Court has also relied upon Article 42's recognition that
the family can be formed by legal or natural bonds and its
guarantee of equal rights and duties for all children whether
born within marriage or not to invalidate numerous provisions of
the Civil Code that discriminated against children born outside
marriage.22
When faced with a challenge to a 1989 law requiring that
birth registries follow the Spanish tradition of using double
apellidos (surnames) with that of the father listed before that of
the mother, however, the Court rejected arguments that this
violated Articles 13, 42, and 43 and international human rights
laws." The majority did not see this as having anything to do
with equality of rights and obligations. They saw the matter as
simply one of logistics: there had to be an order and the law
provided one. Justices Cifuentes, Gaviria, and Martinez
dissented, contending that the law was not innocuous but
reflected a longstanding patriarchal tradition that relegates
220. Sentencia No. T-494/92 (footnote to Constitutional Gaceta omitted).
221. See, e.g., Sentencia No. C-105194; Sentencia No. SU-253/98.
222. Sentencia No. C-152194.
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women to a secondary plane."' They pointed out that the need
for uniformity would also be met by placing the mother's last
name first, but argued that the sensible solution, consistent with
the constitutional principle of equality of rights, would be to
allow couples to decide the order by mutual consent. 224
D. Positive Discrimination
Article 13 textually enshrines the concept of positive
discrimination or affirmative action. As Justice Eduardo
Cifuentes Mufioz notes, the Constitutional Court has accepted
that women are among the marginalized groups entitled to such
affirmative measures:
It seems to me that the general tendency of the Court's
jurisprudence has been to recognize that historically women
belong to a group that has been in conditions of manifest
weakness before men and thus it is necessary that at all
levels the state must take positive differential action. And at
the same time, apart from this positive differentiation, the
woman has equal rights with the man, independent of positive
discrimination, within the bosom of the family, in social
institutions like universities and schools, and in institutions
like Social Security and the world of work.225
The Constitutional Court has taken seriously Article 13's
requirement that "[tihe state will promote conditions so that
equality is real and effective and will adopt measures in favor of
groups discriminated against or marginalized. ' '2 6 In late 1992,
the Court invoked both the positive and negative aspects of
Article 13's concept of equality in a challenge to law granting
single (cdlibes, celibate or never married) daughters of military
officials special social welfare rights.227 In an opinion by Justice
Jos6 Gregorio Hernandez Galindo, the Court upheld the positive
discrimination in favor of daughters over sons as a measure to
223. Salvamento de voto a la Sentencia No. C-152/94.
224. Id. For a discussion of a pending challenge to the law requiring that birth
certificates list the father's last name first, see Socorro Ramirez, Opci6n de apellido,
MUJER/FEMPRESS (Santiago), Jan. 1999, at 3.
225. Interview with Eduardo Cifuentes Mufioz (July 5, 1998), supra note 38.
226. CONST. POL. COL. art. 13.
227. Sentencia No. C-588/92.
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make the principle of equality "real and effective," given women's
frequent economic dependency on men in Colombian society. On
the other hand, it ruled that the discrimination between single
and married daughters violated Article 13's protection against
discrimination and Article 16's guarantee of the free development
of one's personality, reasoning that "every person, in the exercise
of their liberty, must be able to choose without coercion and in a
manner free of stimulation established by the legislator, between
contracting marriage or remaining single." Accordingly, the law
was held valid except for the terms "clibes" and "remains in a
state of celibacy" which were held unenforceable. 28 Although this
decision demonstrates the Court's reliance on the "positive"
aspect of Article 13 in the realm of gender classifications, it has
been criticized as perpetuating stereotypical views of women as
economically dependent.229
In the context of women's employment-related rights, the
Court invoked this principle of positive discrimination in
rejecting a challenge to differential retirement ages of fifty-five
for women and sixty for men.23 ° The Court requested and
considered statistical evidence and opinions by social scientists
before concluding that this positive discrimination in regard to
pension rights was a rational, reasonable, and proportional
measure designed to compensate for women's continuing inferior
position in the labor force and for the physical and mental
burdens placed upon them because of their double workload as
members of the paid labor force and as those responsible for the
society's unpaid domestic work.
The Court rejected a municipality's attempt to denominate
certain housekeeping and maintenance positions as exclusively
for women, however. It established a strict test of necessity for
any attempt to limit employment to persons of one sex and
concluded that it was not indispensable that one be a woman to
perform the essential tasks of these jobs. Men could perform the
jobs as well as women and excluding men meant "contributing to
perpetuating prejudices disregarding the essential equality of all
human beings.""'
228. Id.
229. Interview with Manuel Jose Cepeda, supra note 81.
230. Sentencia No. C-410/94.
231. Sentencia No. T-026/96.
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E. Other Employment-Related Issues
Forty-one percent of the Colombian workforce are women
and 25% of these are heads of households.23 Unemployment
rates are much higher for women than men; in 1996, 15.6% of
women were unemployed, but 9.6% of men.233 In September
1998, the unemployment rate for men was 12.5% and that for
women had risen to 18.0%."' In November 1998, the country's
slow economic growth had resulted in the highest unemployment
rate in twenty-five years; the seven largest cities had an overall
jobless rate of 15.1% consisting mostly of the poor, youth, and
women. 2 5 By the end of 1998, the unemployment rate had risen
to 15.7% in seven cities and 15.9% in eleven cities."' Among
urban residents polled about expectations for 1999, fear of
becoming unemployed displaced fears related to guerrilla
warfare, narcotrafficking, and common crime.237
In addition to the cases dealing with employment rights
discussed in the sections above, the Court has addressed
employment-related issues in numerous other contexts. For
example, in a 1997 decision in an action presented by Maria del
Pilar Leyva and Sandra Cadena Cortdzar, the Court struck down
a part of Article 242 of the labor code that prohibited women
factory workers from working at night.23 " The 1951 law provided
that "[w]omen, regardless or age, cannot be employed during the
night in any industrial company, except a company in which only
members of the same family are employed."2 9 In a unanimous
opinion by Justice Hernando Herrera Vergara, the Court held
that the law violated the constitutional guarantee of equal rights
and opportunities for women and men and added that the state
has a constitutional obligation to promote women's participation
in public and private administrative levels.
In press comments, Olga S~nchez described the Court's
opinion as closing a gap between the law and the reality of
232. Mujeres podrdn trabajar de noche en las industrias, EL TIEMPO (Bogota), Nov.
28, 1997.
233. Discriminaci6n, EL TIEMPO (Bogotd), Sept. 26, 1997.
234. Sube el empleo independiente, EL TIEMPO (Bogota), Jan. 4, 1999.
235. Vivienda social, la gran empleadora, EL TIEMPO (BogotA), Nov. 18, 1998.
236. Sube el empleo independiente, supra note 234.
237. Al pais le ird peor que a los colombianos, EL TIEMPO (Bogota), Dec. 26, 1998.
238. Sentencia No. C-622/97; Mujeres podrdn trabajar, supra note 232.
239. Sentencia No. C-622197.
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women's lives:
The decision of the Constitutional Court reconciles the reality
of the country with the law. Many women, by necessity, work
at night. What the Court has done and is doing is to legalize
what already had come into existence.... This law, that existed
in the Labor Code to favor one condition of the woman, that of
housewife and mother of the family, now is not in accord with
the process of change that women have undergone in our
society....240
Another case from late 1997, though not directly involving
claims of sex discrimination, bears mentioning here. In October,
the Constitutional Court ruled that all employees, whether public
or private, have a constitutional right to earn a salary that is
proportional to the quantity and quality of the work they
perform: "for equal work, equal pay." 4' The Court stated that
salary differentials were permitted but must correspond to
justified, real, proven reasons and not simply to the subjective
preferences of the employer or an intent to impede or discourage
union activity or other worker organizing.
The Court has also addressed the rights of domestic workers.
In 1995, the Court itself raised the issue in a public action of
unconstitutionality brought by the People's Defender against
another provision of the labor code."' The Court invalidated
portions of the code that provided lesser unemployment benefits
for domestic workers, concluding that if domestic service is a
luxury those who enjoy it must pay for it in a manner similar to
240. Mujeres podrdn trabajar, supra note 232. In comparison, a 1997 amendment to
Japan's Equal Employment Opportunity Law of 1987 that will permit women to work at
night has provoked mixed reactions among working women and women's organizations.
Some greeted the new law as an extension of employment rights for women, allowing
them to compete for better paying nighttime jobs now held by men. Others believe the
law was really designed to allow big business to be more competitive and will lead to
women being forced to work night shifts and overtime or to their being forced into lower
paying part-time jobs. THE WOMEN'S WATCH, Sept. 1997, at 4.
241. Sentencia No. SU-519/97; Corte Constitucional respalda equidad salarial, EL
TIEMPO (Bogotd), Oct. 16, 1997. In the United States equal pay for equal work, not child
care as had been expected, was the top concern among working women in a national
survey by the AFL-CIO. Ninety-four percent of those polled said equal pay was very
important to them and over one-third believed they did not receive it. THE WOMEN'S
WATCH, supra note 240, at 4.
242. Sentencia No. C-051/95. The Court also invalidated the labor code's
authorization of lesser social benefits for employees of non-profit entities which was
challenged by the People's Defender.
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how other employees are paid. Limiting the benefits to domestic
workers was in opposition to raising their standard of living as
the constitutional principle of social solidarity required.
However, the opinion found certain differences in the labor code's
treatment of domestic workers such as different maximum hours
of work to be reasonable.243 In July 1998, the Court upheld the
Labor Code's broad definition of what constitutes "salary" for the
predominantly female domestic workers. 2 ' But the opinion by
Justice Fabio Mor6n also warned employers that domestic
workers have the right to overtime pay for work in excess of ten
hours a day.
In 1994, the Court found a social security policy to be
unconstitutional. The policy at issue established medical
benefits for the wives or permanent companions of male
employee members but did not provide such benefits to members'
husbands or male companions.4 ' By means of a tutela a woman
employee challenged the policy when her husband was denied
coverage.46
In an opinion by Justice Cifuentes, the Court ruled that the
agency's action violated Article 13's equality guarantees and
ordered it to put an end to this sex discrimination by
immediately considering the application for benefits for
petitioner's spouse.47 The opinion demonstrates the Court's
proactive role in leading Colombian society away from traditional
ways of thinking about women and their roles. Justice Cifuentes
noted that "[tihe historical vision of woman's role must not affect
... the recognition of benefits that have the effect of increasing
her income as a pensioner."48  The Court also challenged
traditional views of machismo as it pointed out that the reality in
Colombia no longer sustains such a social construct:
A less weighty reason for sustaining the ability of only men
pensioners to claim their spouses or permanent companions is
expressed in the stereotype that a man who is dependent on
his woman is less "manly." This social prejudice, however, is
243. Sentencia No. C-051/95.
244. Sentencia No. C-372/98; St al pago de horas extras para empleadas domvsticas,
EL TIEMPO (Bogotd), July 22, 1998.





contrary to the statistics of a growing number of women
"heads of family" who, for diverse circumstances, have
responsibility for the costs of the home. . .. The simple
cultural conception of the roles of men and women cannot be
used to deprive a woman of the benefit of extending social
security to her spouse or permanent companion, as the legal
249rules provide for men.
In an interview, Justice Cifuentes pointed out that in this
social security case the Court was cognizant of both visible and
invisible forms of discrimination. Cifuentes also observed that
this case was the Court's first decision to reach beyond the
particulars of the case at hand as it directed the social security
agency to cease the discrimination against women."'
In 1996, the Court ruled that an older law that terminated
survivor benefits to a worker's widow if she remarried violated
widows' constitutional rights of equality and the right to the free
development of one's personality.25 ' It announced that any
woman denied benefits pursuant to this law after 1991 could
obtain payments.
Other gender-related cases include several related to
military training and service. In 1994, the Court rejected
arguments that not subjecting women to obligatory military
service was unconstitutional.25 In 1995, Adriana Granados, a
nineteen-year-old woman, filed a tutela claiming equal rights to
admission to Colombia's navy."' Her success in that case paved
the way for the enrollment of the first twenty-eight women
cadets.254 After tutelas in 1996 dealing with admission to the air
force55 and to the naval officer training school,256 in 1997, thirty-
four women joined the Fuerza Agrea as pilot trainees and twenty
entered the naval officers training school.2 7 Military installations
249. Id.
250. Interview with Eduardo Cifuentes Mufoz (July 5, 1995), supra note 38.
251. Sentencia No. C-309/96.
252. Sentencia No. C-511/94.
253. Sentencia No. T-624195.
254. Pamela Mercer, Colombians Winning Quick Redress from Courts with Writs,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1996, at A19.
255. Sentencia No. T-704/96.
256. Sentencia No. T-463/96.
257. De coronelas a generalas, MUJER/FEMPRESS (Santiago), Nov. 1998, at 14.
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have been adapted to provide private lodging, separate
bathrooms, pregnancy tests, and maternity uniforms.25
IV. COLOMBIAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT
The preceding discussion presents a fairly positive picture of
Colombia's contemporary gender jurisprudence. That picture,
however, is incomplete without a more in depth consideration of
issues such as access to courts, lower courts' responses to the
Constitutional Court's opinions, and legislative responses to
those decisions-issues which I am at present unable to fully
assess. Nevertheless, thus far the work of the Constitutional
Court has overall been favorably received by the justices on the
Court itself, of -varying views, and by women's rights activists
and those sympathetic to their causes. I do not present critiques
of these decisions from those embracing more traditional
standpoints on gender issues, but the last part of this section
describes the more general attacks upon the Court's use of the
tutela and the ensuing public debate.
A. Views on the Court's Gender Jurisprudence
Despite the limitation imposed by comparative legal
scholarship-the difficulty of assessing the cultural import of
legal decisions from a distance and by an outsider-based on the
available evidence from the media and my interviews, many
Colombians' evaluations of the Constitutional Court's evolving
gender jurisprudence are mixed but positive overall.
First, the justices themselves view their gender decisions as
an important part of the early jurisprudence under the new
Constitution. When interviewed in 1995, Justice Cifuentes'
general assessment of the role of the Constitutional Court in
protecting the rights of women and minorities was positive.259
Similarly, in 1998 interviews Justice Cifuentes, as well as
Justices Barrera, Beltrdn, Herndndez, and Martinez, expressed
generally favorable opinions concerning the importance of the
Court's gender jurisprudence.2 60
258. Id.
259. Interview with Eduardo Cifuentes Mufioz (July 5, 1995), supra note 38.
260. Interviews with Antonio Barrera Carbonell, supra note 142; Alfredo Beltr6n
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Although he gave the Court an overall positive rating on
gender issues, Justice Cifuentes criticized the abortion decisions
and pointed to the absence of women on the Constitutional Court
and their low numbers in other important positions as evidence
of the persistence of machismo and intolerance. He further
observed that women's real access to the world of work has not
been commensurate with the Constitutional Court's ideals and
opinions. Cifuentes nonetheless remained optimistic about
political activism and "an awakening of the rights of the
woman,.. .especially of the woman campesina, the woman of the
poor sectors of the population. ""'
Sierra, Magistrado of the Colombian Constitutional Court, BogotA, Colombia (Dec. 16,
1998); Eduardo Cifuentes Mufioz (Dec. 11, 1998), supra note 107; Jose Gregorio
Herndndez, supra note 160; and Alejandro Martinez Caballero, Magistrado of the
Colombian Constitutional Court, Bogotd, Colombia (Dec. 14, 1998).
261. Interview with Eduardo Cifuentes Mufioz (July 5, 1995), supra note 38. After
the Congressional elections of March 8, 1998 (held on International Women's Day), the
number of women in the Colombian Senate doubled from seven to fourteen (out of a total
of 102 senators) and the number of women in the House increased from sixteen to
nineteen of the 167 members. Socorro Ramirez, Casi casi la hora de las mujeres,
MUJER/FEMPRESS (Santiago), May 1998, at 6. And, after several attempts to pass
legislation implementing the 1991 Constitution's promise in Article 40 of adequate
participation of women in all spheres of public power, in 1998 a bill passed the House and
moved to the Senate. The bill would have required that, beginning in January 1999, at
least thirty percent of decision-making or higher level positions be held by women.
Socorro Ramirez, Mayor Participaci6n en Poderes Pdblicos, MUJER/FEMPRESS (Santiago),
May 1998, at 14. The Council of State had earlier refused to consider Article 40 to be self-
executing. Like at least four prior proposals, the 1998 quota bill failed to gain approval.
One positive sign for the future of women's political participation was the remarkably
strong showing by Noemi Sanin, an independent candidate for president in the 1998
elections, who came close to making the run-off election.
For discussion of affirmative action with respect to access to elective and party
positions as expressly guaranteed under Article 37 of the 1994 Argentine Constitution
and of Argentina's earlier law (Ley No. 24012) that guarantees a minimum of thirty
percent of candidates for national elective office be women, see Maria Teresa Flores, La
igualdad real de oportunidades, INVESTIGARE, Afio 1, No. 2 (on file with author).
In addition to Argentina and Colombia, within Latin America the constitutions
of Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Paraguay impose affirmative duties to promote
women's equality. On the regional legislative front, Bolivia adopted a law similar to
Argentina's 1991 law in 1996, and a 1995 Brazilian law requires political parties to
ensure that women hold at least 20% of elected positions. Effective in 1996, an
amendment to Costa Rica's Electoral Law requires political parties to adopt mechanisms
to assure that 40% of candidate lists be women. See REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 46, at 23. In Guatemala, women's
organizations together with leading women in the Guatemalan Congress have proposed a
quota law requiring that at least thirty percent of candidates be women. The Guatemalan
Congress rejected quota proposals in 1991 and 1994, as did the Electoral Reform
Committee (formed pursuant to the peace accords) in 1997. See DEMOCRACIA Y
PARTICIPACION POLITICA DE LAS MUJERES EN GUATEMALA (2d ed. 1998).
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A former Colombian judge now living and teaching law in
the United States, Luz Nagle, offered a positive assessment of
the significance of the tutela on gender issues in Colombia:
In a country where the justice system is greatly inefficient, the
courts have been unreachable and have reinforced the
disaffection, discrimination, and subjugation of women; the
law is the exclusive possession of the wealthy, the elite, the
judges and the lawyers; sexism, patriarchy, and machismo are
the rule, the tutela is the only hope for transformation.
Tutelas have become a quick and friendly way for women to
redress their issues. The "regular" system is still impregnated
with bias and the social stereotype that women ought to be
submissive, "walk behind their man," supporting him without
complaint. To reach a resolution through a lawsuit takes too
long. Now, with the tutela, women are heard....
Using tutelas, vocal and determined women have challenged
the status quo and demanded that the largely male court and
the country pay attention to their concerns. Women are using
tutelas to change, if not the society's approach to them, the
legal system that rules them.... Tutela is improving equal
rights and is serving as a vehicle for social change.2 2
She too cautioned, however, that the "possibility of imminent
transformation" requires more than tutela decisions. "It requires
more aggressive and meaningful approaches by women, more
women in high and influential positions and a real commitment
from men."263
(Note: As this article went to press, the Colombian Congress finally approved a law that,
upon approval by the President and a favorable review by the Constitutional Court, would
require that thirty percent of high public offices, including ministers, be held by women
and that a woman be included on candidate lists for appointment to the Constitutional
Court and certain other bodies. See Juanita Le6n, Mujeres, a las altas esferas, EL TiEMpo
(Bogota), June 23, 1999. President Pastrana raised objections to this quota bill, however,
returning the matter to Congress. E-mail message from Catalina Botero (July 21, 1999).]
262. Statement by Professor Luz Estella Nagle, Nov. 25, 1998 (on file with author).
For an outside scholar's assessment of other aspects of the tutela, see Alexander P.
Springer, Political Justice? Assessing the Role of Colombian Courts, Paper presented at
the meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Chicago, Ill., Sept. 24-26, 1998




Although studies of the Court's work are few thus far,
Colombia's official reply to an Inter-American Human Rights
Commission questionnaire's inquiry about the decisions reached
in gender discrimination cases in the last five years gave the
following characterization of the cases: "In all cases in which it
has been demonstrated that the conduct was discriminatory and
violated fundamental human rights, there has been a good
disposition by the judges and courts to render opinions favorable
to the petitioners.""4
The response also notes that, according to researchers at
Colombia's National University, the Constitutional Court has
had a very important influence on the attitude of judicial
authorities towards women.265 Despite evidence that more men
266than women won favorable tutela decisions in labor matters,
the researchers concluded that the Constitutional Court has been
important for women, not only because it has unified the
jurisprudence on gender, but also because of its broad reading of
the new constitutional rights for women.
Other surveys of the Court's gender jurisprudence that have
been undertaken have given it mixed appraisals. In a document
prepared for use in training and workshops on the new
constitution, Marta Lucia Tamayo provides an overview of the
jurisprudence produced under the new constitution and
concludes that it has been varied and contradictory. 67 On one
side she places advances and preciseness in themes such as
equality, protection of workers' maternity rights, women's rights
in the educational and penitentiary systems, and domestic
violence. But she also observes stagnation and conservatism in
areas of reproductive autonomy.
In a more empirical study, Isabel Cristina Jaramillo, a
professor of judicial theory at the Universidad de los Andes, has
264. REPUESTA AL CUESTIONARiO, supra note 48, at 122.
265. Id. at 52, citing DIRECCION GENERAL DE POLITICAS JURIDICAS Y DESARROLLO
LEGISLATIVO, supra note 48.
266. Of the thirty-eight cases studied, women won in thirteen of the thirty-eight in
the first instance, in three of twenty-two on appeal, and in eighteen of the thirty-eight in
the Constitutional Court. Id. at 52. The researchers also found that Colombian judges
they interviewed shared many of society's gender stereotypes in the family law areas. On
the average, male judges had more progressive gender attitudes than did female judges.
Id. at 54.
267. MARTA LUCIA TAMAYO, LA NUEVA CONSTITUCION Y LOS DERECHOS DE LAS
MUJEREs 39 (1995) (on file with author).
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chronicled and critiqued the Court's jurisprudence on women.
She examined a sample of 123 decisions-105 tutelas and
eighteen actions of unconstitutionality. Of the tutelas, 58.1%
were resolved favorably for the complainant (as opposed to only
43.3% of all tutelas) but the results varied among the nine tutela
panels. Jaramillo presents hypotheses concerning (1) the
existence of two different images of the woman-capable, strong,
and equal to the man in the public sphere and weak,
economically dependent, loving, sacrificing, fully a mother, in the
private spheres-and (2) the existence of parallel tensions
between a concept of protection of the woman based on
paternalism and one based on recognizing women as autonomous
subjects, and between the perception that women must be
protected as part of a less favored social group and the perception
that women must not be given undeserved privileges. 26
In a valuable recent publication, Jaramillo and other
researchers in a project directed by Cristina Motta present an
analysis of the "reach of the Constitution," that focuses on the
123 cases in Jaramillo's study, categorizing and describing the
Court's gender jurisprudence.269 They also analyze the debates
about women's rights in the Constitutional Assembly and provide
a comparison of women's rights in other Latin American
Constitutions. Asserting that "[11aw has found, in the field of
issues of gender, a privileged space to demonstrate its true
emancipatory and reality transformative capacity," 7' their
assessment of the Court's gender jurisprudence addresses both
its legal and symbolic value. They emphasize the privileged
position that the Court's institutional role as the legitimate
interpreter of the constitution gives it as a speaker in the social
discourse over gender issues and its consequent influence in the
construction of the social discourse around issues of gender.271
Turning to views of other women's rights advocates, Maria
Isabel Plata and Maria Cristina Calder6n, Executive Director
and Director of Legal Services for PROFAMILIA, gave very high
marks to the Court's gender decisions. Plata credited the Court
with "giving the air that was needed in Colombian Law to new
268. ISABEL CRISTINA JARAMILLO S., CRONICA DE LA JURISPRUDENCIA DE LA CORTE
CONSTITUCIONAL COLOMBIANA SOBRE LAS MUJERES (work in progress).
269. OBSERVATORIO LEGAL DE LA MUJER, supra note 153.
270. Id. at 7.
271. Id. at 33-34.
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ideas, ideas of change, to new interpretations, to recognizing
women, recognizing differences."272 Calder6n commented on the
importance of the Court's use of international human rights
conventions to support its decisions with an in depth study of
human rights: "Each decision is a class in Law."" 3 They proclaim
themselves strong defenders of the Court, and express concern
only about the abortion decisions.
Socorro Ramirez, Colombian feminist author and historian
who has closely followed the development of women's rights
under the new constitution, notes how widely women have
resorted to the courts to protect their rights under the new
constitution. She credits the Constitutional Court with breaking
new ground under the new constitution but her overall
assessment of the Court's work is mixed. According to Ramirez,
despite substantial advances, the Court lags behind in its
treatment of women's reproductive and sexual rights.274
Referring to a study of the Court's decisions dealing with these
rights by Lizeth Salazar, a law student at the National
University of Colombia, she observes that, "a definition of
reproductive and sexual rights as fundamental rights does not
exist; instead they are immersed in other classic rights such as
life, equality, liberty, and personal security...." The study points
out that international organizations are formulating such
definitions as a means of assuring meaningful equality for
women.
2 7 5
Ramirez' own critique of the Constitutional Court's most
recent abortion decision revealed her disappointment with the
performance of the majority of the Court in that case.276 But she
and other feminists were heartened by the separate views of four
of the nine justices. She reported on Justice Cifuentes' remarks
at a press conference held in PROFAMILIA on February 27,
1997, where he criticized the Court's ruling as "sacrificing
greater goods such as human liberty and impeding its
fulfillment."
2 7
272. Interview with Maria Isabel Plata, supra note 4.
273. Interview with Maria Cristina Calderdn, supra note 2.
274. Socorro Ramirez, La tutela, 187 MUJER/FEMPRESS (Santiago), May 1997, at 6.
275. Id.
276. Socorro Ramirez, Defensora de enciclicas or de derechos? 186 MUJER/FEMPRESS
(Santiago), Apr. 1997, at 9.
277. Id. Justice Cifuentes' remarks reportedly moved feminist psychologist Florence
Thomas to say, "For the first time I have the feeling that at last they hear us and that we
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Speaking in late 1998, Ramirez underscored the unresolved
tension in the court's jurisprudence between philosophies of
individualism and communalism."' Similarly, Dean Cepeda did
not believe that the Court had gone far enough in confronting the
subordination of women or in addressing the institutional, as
opposed to individualistic, aspects of discrimination based on
sexual orientation.279 In short, what Sonia Alvarez has noted in
discussing the Brazilian Constitution's recognition of women's
rights appears to be true in Colombia as well: gender role
equality has more easily won acceptance than has gender role
change.2"'
And the picture is even more complex for Afro-Colombian
women who bear multiple burdens in Colombia. Senator Piedad
C6rdoba, herself an Afro-Colombian, spoke of the
intersectionality of gender, race, and class and the "triple
discrimination" of being a woman, black, and poor. She noted
the resistance of these strains of discrimination to cure through
formal legal guarantees, observing that articles in the
constitution alone will not end this kind of discrimination. 281
are on the point of winning this battle." Id.
278. Interview with Socorro Ramirez, BogotA, Colombia (Dec. 10, 1998).
279. Interview with Manuel Jos6 Cepeda, supra note 81.
280. SONIA E. ALVAREZ, ENGENDERING DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL: WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS
IN TRANSITIONAL POLITICS 252 (1990).
281. Interview with Senator Piedad C6rdoba de Castro, Bogotd, Colombia (July 4,
1995). In an earlier interview with the New York Times, Senator Cordoba de Castro
spoke of the difficulties posed by the low level of identification among black and mixed-
race people in Latin America. Karen De Witt, Black Unity Finds Voice in Colombia, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 18, 1995, at A5. She acknowledged the lack of reliable statistics because
countries do not openly categorize by race but estimated that blacks represented 21% of
Colombia's 35 million people. Id. In a recent poll, 83% of Colombians interviewed said
that they were not racist but 85% believed that there is racism in Colombia, and 78% had
witnessed racial discrimination. Francisco Celis Albert, Racismo a flor de piel, EL TIEMPO
(Bogoti), Oct. 12, 1998. According to social anthropologist Mauricio Pardo, "we tend to
think that racism does not exist because.. .constitutionally we are equal befbre the law.
Id. But, one can think that it is bad to be racist and at the same time have a series of
contradictory attitudes." He pointed out: "Indigenous people and blacks were
subordinated by law. Blacks until 1853, with the abolition of slavery, and los indios until
1991 with the new Constitution. Before, los indios were considered minors. Id. See
generally PETER WADE, BLACKNESS AND RACE MIXTURE: THE DYNAMICS OF RACIAL
IDENTITY IN COLOMBIA x (1993):
The official image of Colombia is that of a racial democracy, and even, in the
new Constitution of 1991, of an ethnically plural society, but beneath or
rather parallel to and integrated with this image is a pervasive, apparently
self-evident social order in which Colombia is a mestizo, or mixed blood,
nation that is gradually erasing Blackness (and indianness) from its
panorama.
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Moreover, as the Senator further observed, "Afro-Colombians live
in the poorest regions of the country," and they have no "visible
presence" in positions of power or authority.
282
Not surprisingly, the Court's decisions enforcing
fundamental rights have not eradicated the discriminatory
practices challenged. For example, despite the Court's rulings
protecting pregnant teenagers' educational rights, complaints
continue about instances where such students have been expelled
or required to attend night classes or special tutoring sessions.
Last year parents have presented fifty-seven complaints about
expulsions of pregnant students, according to the president of the
federation of parents' associations. A campaign to raise societal
consciousness and provide support for these students has been
launched under the theme "If the test is positive, don't take a
negative attitude."' But, on the other hand, the prevalence of
these tutela actions themselves demonstrate that many pregnant
teenagers and their families are now aware of their rights and of
how to challenge their denial. And the same is true in the other
areas covered by this Article.
B. Tutelitis or Protection of Fundamental Rights?
Within Colombia, critics of the Constitutional Court's
activist role in protecting fundamental rights have targeted its
use of the tutela, lamenting that the country is suffering from an
epidemic of tutelitis. From the tutela's introduction in November
1991 until August 1997, 142,635 of them were initiated; by 1998
the Constitutional Court had reviewed and ruled on
approximately 2,700.2" Justice Jos6 Gregorio Herndndez Galindo,
Id.
For discussion of the Constitutional Court's treatment of tutelas on behalf of
indigenous and Afro-Colombian petitioners, see Donna Lee Van Cott, The Impact of the
1991 Colombian Constitution: Ethnic Rights, Paper prepared for delivery at the XXI
International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Chicago, Ill., Sept. 24-
26, 1998. For cases protecting the rights of indigenous communities, see also,
DESARROLLO JURISPRUDENCIAL DE LA CONSTITUCION POIfTICA, supra note 82, at 22. See
generally Cepeda, supra note 6, at 83-84 (noting that the Court has protected indigenous
community rights even when no individual fumdamental right was violated).
[In late May, 1999, Senator Cordoba herself was a victim of kidnapping by paramilitaries
who held her for two weeks before releasing her.]
282. Id.
283. EL TIEMPO <http://www.eltiempo.com/diariolunesbogOl.htm>.
284. Magistrados, con lcera por tutelas, EL TIEMPO (Bogotd), Aug. 27, 1997;
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speaking while President of the Constitutional Court, turned
aside concerns about the judicial system being "flooded" with
these citizen injunctions:
I do not consider that the exercise of the action of tutela can be
understood as a flood but more as the desperate search of
those who do not have other judicial avenues for their defense,
for effective and prompt solutions to various serious
circumstances that affect to a greater or lesser degree their
fundamental rights.
Our concern should not be with how to counteract the use of a
tool created for the protection of rights but with verifying that
in practice and always, human dignity is respected and
285violations of the guarantees cease.
During his term as President of the Constitutional Court,
Justice Carlos Gaviria Diaz echoed support for the tutela: "We
want to make sure that people's fundamental rights do not just
stay on paper." Fewer tutelas will be filed, he said, as
Colombians become aware that there are penalties for violating
constitutional rights.28
Other judges in the country-especially judges on the
Colombian Supreme Court who lack the Constitutional Court's
discretionary review power and must rule on all tutelas appealed
to them and whose own opinions have been held subject to attack
by tutelas in some instances-do express concern about the
proliferation of tutelas. As presiding judge of Colombia's
Supreme Court, Judge Jos6 Roberto Herrera argued that there
has been "a great abuse." In his opinion, "about 90% of the cases
we see are frivolous.""7 He estimated that the Supreme Court
spends 60-80% of its time reviewing appeals in tutela actions.
In August 1997, the president of the Supreme Court
appeared before a Congressional Committee considering
proposed reforms to the tutela and vehemently denounced the
REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA CORTE CONSTITUcIONAL SISTEMAS, JURISPRUDENCIA DE LA
CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL, 1 DE FEBRERO DE 1992 HASTA [20] DE NOVIEMBRE DE 1998.
285. John Guti~rrez, La radiografia de la accidn de tutela (II), EL TIEMPO (Bogot.4),
Jan. 9, 1996.
286. Darling, supra note 3.
287. Id.
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"avalanche" of tutelas that his court must consider. He noted that
his court had considered 11,000-five times the number that the
Constitutional Court, with its discretionary review, has decided.
He complained that because of these cases he had no time to
take care of his family or attend social events, and blamed the
workload for giving him an ulcer. 28
Interviewed while still on the Constitutional Court, Justice
Jorge Arango Mejia maintained that the tutela has had both
positive and negative effects.289  It has "served to defend,
maintain, and show respect for fundamental rights consecrated
in the constitution" but also "has produced great congestion" in
the courts of first or second instance because "people have abused
the action of tutela by presenting an exaggerated number of
tutelas in cases where they are not justified."8 '
According to remarks delivered by then Justice Arango in
1995, several factors explain why Colombians have used the
tutela as if it were a universal panacea.28' First, judges, lawyers,
and litigants do not understand the purposes of the action and
the rights it protects. Widespread publicity has led some to
believe that "to file a tutela is to affirm your condition as citizen
or demonstrate that you are in the 'latest fashion."'292 One does
not need a lawyer to file the action and this has led to an
unwonted flowering of tinterillos (untrained lay providers of legal
services) eager to make money without being concerned about the
client's interests. 2 Moreover, "Colombians have traditionally
been litigious. Now, overnight, we've seen them given an easy to
manage weapon, that apparently serves for the most dissimilar
uses and that effortlessly satiates the passion to litigate.""4 Add
to all this "the deficiencies in public administration and
especially the slowness of justice and it is easy to understand
288. Magistrados, con 6lcera por tutelas, supra note 284.
289. Interview with Jorge Arango Mejfa, supra note 94. See also Jorge Arango Mejia,
La tutela y la seguridad juridica, presented May 23, 1995, Cali, Colombia (on file with
author).
290. Interview with Jorge Arango Mejia, supra note 94.
291. Arango Mejifa, supra note 289.
292. Id.
293. Id. Article 38 of Decree 2591 of 1991, provides that lawyers who file several
actions based on the same facts and rights will be punished by suspension of their
professional card for at least two years and by cancellation of their professional license for
repeated instances of such conduct.
294. Id.
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why there is a tendency to convert the action of tutela into a type
of magic legal remedy."9 '
Arango predicted that the number of tutelas will not
decrease. 96 Noting that Article 41 of the Constitution requires
all schools to teach about the Constitution, he warned that "a
superficial and disorderly understanding of the Constitution and
the laws will not make good citizens but bad litigants." 297 He
described that the situation as a "vicious circle." "There is an
excess of tutela actions because ordinary justice is slow,
inefficient, and as tutelas increase, of necessity, it will be slower
and more inefficient."298
In a sample of fifty-six judges surveyed as part of a 1995
Ministry of Justice study of the tutela, 93% said it was an
effective mechanism for the protection of rights and 95% believed
that the problems associated with its use could be resolved.
However, 79% concluded that law schools were not providing
sufficient training to enable future judges to resolve problems of
constitutional law.299
As justices differ in their assessment of the tutela, so do
others in the society. "The tutela has been like a tank of oxygen
for the judicial system," according to Gustavo Zafra, dean of the
Javierana University law school. "The law has ceased to be the
monopoly of judges and 75,000 lawyers." Instead, courts must
now speak the language of citizens, much like the Vatican's
mandate that priests turn and face their congregations and
celebrate Mass in contemporary languages. 300
Mauricio Garcia, who heads the Center of Judicial
Investigations at the Universidad de los Andes, credits the action
with improving equal rights,'O and Manuel Jos6 Cepeda, dean of
the law school at the same university, says the new action has
proved that the law can apply to everyone-"a novel concept in
Colombia." °2  He points out that if courts acted more





299. Guti~rrez, supra note 285.
300. Darling, supra, note 3.
301. Mercer, supra note 254.
302. Darling, supra note 3.
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
intentionally delaying tactics to prolong such litigation, fewer
tutelas would be filed.30 3
In a recently published volume on political reform in
Colombia, Cepeda elaborated on his assessment of the role of the
Constitutional Court, in general, and the tutela, in particular.
Cepeda lauds the tutela as "a very successful instrument for the
redistribution of power." " He observes that the accessibility of
the tutela, now used by even "marginalised citizens," has
"contributed to the spread of constitutional values." 5 Cepeda
concludes that, "[tihe court has indeed been a leader of a
revolution protecting fundamental rights: it has 'taken rights
seriously'; it has conceived itself as a 'forum of principles."'3 °6
The Colombian public generally voices strong support for the
tutela. In a 1996 poll, more than 77% said that the actions help
solve the problem of the judicial system's inefficiency.0 7 Despite
its popularity among litigants and the public, from its inception
the tutela has been the object of fierce attacks. In 1997, the
Colombian Congress came close to approving Constitutional
reforms of the controversial action. Congressional hearings
provided a platform for a highly publicized turf battle with the
Constitutional Court on one side and the Supreme Court and the
Council of State on the other.0 8 One of the major points of
contention was the Constitutional Court's willingness to allow
use of tutelas as a means of attack on rulings of the Supreme
Court and the Council of State."' The other was the heavy work
load tutela appeals have imposed on these tribunals. In the end,
on November 18, 1997, Congress sided with the Constitutional
303. Id.
304. Cepeda, supra note 6, at 91.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Mercer, supra note 254.
308. See, e.g., La tutela, entre dos fuegos, EL PAIS (Cali), Sept. 3, 1997; Se ahonda
pugna entre cortes por tutela, EL TIEMPO (Bogoti), Sept. 4, 1997; 'Si se aprueba reforma a
la tutela, que se acabe la Corte,' EL TIEMPO (Bogotd), Sept. 5, 1997; 'No son omnipotentes,'
EL TIEMPO (Bogotb), Sept. 11, 1997; Nuevo round de cortes por tutela, EL ESPECTADOR
(Bogotd), Sept. 11, 1997, at A14; Reformas a la tutela, un debate sin fin, EL TIEMPO
(Bogoti), Sept. 11, 1997.
309. See, e.g., La tutela vuelve a enfrentar a cortes, EL TIEMPO (Bogotd), Aug. 31, 1997;
'Hay conspiracin contra la tutela,' EL TIEMPO (BogotA), Sept. 6, 1997; 'Tutelazo' al
Consejo de Estado, EL TIEMPO (Bogotd), Sept. 12, 1997; Tutela no puede atentar contra la
seguridad jurdica,' EL TIEMPO (Bogota), Nov. 10, 1997; Nueva desautorizacin entre
Cortes,'EL TIEMPO (Bogota), Nov. 10, 1997.
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Court and refused to weaken the popular new constitutional
mechanism."' 0
V. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE COURTS, CULTURE
WARS, AND LAW'S TRANSFORMATIVE POWER
A. Sources for Colombia's Constitutional
Interpretation
What accounts for how readily the justices of the Colombian
Constitutional Court have embraced such generous interpretive
methodologies and willingly used them in an activist defiance of
many traditional cultural beliefs? One obvious explanation for
the mindsets of the justices of the Colombian Constitutional
Court is that they are not interpreting provisions adopted in
1791 or 1868 but a Charter that is still in its infancy and whose
original meaning is closer at hand.3 ' Indeed, Justice Cifuentes
pointed to that as one factor differentiating the Colombian and
U.S. situations. 2
A related explanation for the Colombian Court's expansive
interpretations, and one that Justice Cifuentes also mentioned,
can be traced to the fact that the new constitution, like
contemporary constitutions generally, is much longer and more
explicit than our federal constitution. (When adopted it was one
of the world's longest national constitutions.) As discussed above,
the Constitution has numerous provisions establishing rights
ranging from equality to free development of personality and
imposes affirmative duties to promote may of these rights. Title
I of the Constitution (Articles 1-10) sets out fundamental
principles, among which the most significant for the Court's work
have been Article 4's recognition of the Constitution as law, and
as the supreme law of the land (norma de normas), Article l's
principle that Colombia is an estado social de derecho (social
310. John Guti6rrez, 'Congreso no d66 la talla en reforma de tutela,' EL TIEMPO
(BogotA), Nov. 28, 1997.
311. But close proximity to the framing of the document also carries with it a
heightened awareness of the complex and diverse motives of the founders and of the
corresponding difficulty of ascertaining either their subjective intent (which Justice Scalia
himself rejects as a proper interpretive guide) or the "objective intent" or "import" of their
work in a static sense.
312. Interview with Eduardo Cifuentes Muftoz (Dec. 11, 1998), supra note 107.
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state of law), and the principles of participatory democracy,
solidarity, and convivencia (coexistence) recognized in Articles 1
and 2."' And in keeping with the new Constitution's acceptance
of the need for limits on both public and private centers of power,
the protection of many of its rights extends to both public and
private actors.314
313. CONST. POL. COL. art. 1:
Colombia is a social state of law, organized in the form of a unitary
republic, decentralized, with autonomy of its territorial entities, democratic,
participatory and pluralist, founded in respect for human dignity, work, and
the solidarity of the people who comprise it and in the prevailing of the
general interest.
[Colombia es un Estado social de derecho, organizado en forma de
repdblica unitarial, descentralizada, con autonomia de sus entidades
territoriales, democrdtica, participativa y pluralista, fundada en el respeto de
]a dignidad humana, en el trabajo y la solidaridad de las personas que la
integran y en la prevalencia del interts general.]
Article 2 describes the essential ends of the State as:
To serve the community and promote general prosperity and to guarantee
the effectiveness of the principles, rights, and duties consecrated in the
Constitution; to facilitate the participation of all in the decisions that affect
them and in the economic, political, administrative, and cultural life of the
nation; to defend the national independence, maintain territorial integrity
and to ensure peaceful coexistence and the existence of a just order.
The authorities of the republic are instituted to protect all people who are
residents in Colombia, in their life, honor, goods, beliefs, and other rights and
liberties, and to ensure the compliance with the social duties of the State and
private individuals,
[CONST. POL. COL. art. 2:
Son fines esenciales del Estado: servr a la comunidad, promover la
prosperidad general y garantizar la efectividad de los principios, derechos y
deberes consagrados en la Constituci6n; facilitar la participaci6n de todos en
las decisiones que los afectan y en la vida econ6mica, politica, administrativa
y cultural de la naci6n; defender la independencia nacional, mantener ]a
integridad territorial y asegurar la convivencia pacifica y la vigencia de un
orden justo.
Las autoridades de Ia rep-dblica estdn instituidas para proteger a todas las
personas residentes en Colombia, en su vida, honra, bienes, creencias y demds
derechos y libertades, y para asegurar el cumplimiento de los deberes sociales
del Estado y de los particulares.]
314. As noted, the text of the Constitution expressly contemplates its application to
private power in at least some instances. Thus Article 86 provides that "the law will
establish those cases in which the action oftutela will proceed against individuals charged
with rendering a public service or whose conduct seriously and directly affects the
collective interest, or with respect to whom the applicant is found in a state of
subordination or vulnerability." CONST. POL. COL. Art. 86. In its gender cases alone, the
court has granted relief against private actors ranging from private schools to husbands.
As previously noted, other rights under the 1991 Constitution are expressly applicable to
private entities. For example, Article 15 provides, in part: "All people have the right to
personal and family intimacy and to their good name. In the same manner, they have the
right to know, update, and correct information that has been collected about them in data
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Looking not just to its length or to the number of rights the
Colombian Constitution protects but to the nature and scope of
these rights has greater explanatory value. As we have seen, in
keeping with the principle of a social state of law, the
constitution protects not only so-called "first generation" civil and
political rights, understood as negative, individual rights, but
also affirmative and collective second and third generational
rights such as social, economic, and cultural rights. In refusing
to accept a limited conception of "fundamental rights," the Court
has furthered the positive rights regime of the constitution. The
Court grounds its broad interpretive hermeneutic "in the
constitutional mandate according to which, the Colombian State
is founded on the value of human dignity, which determines, not
only a negative duty of non-interference but also a positive duty
of protection and maintenance of the conditions of life with
dignity." 15  In this sense, like some originalists of U.S.
jurisprudence, the Colombian Constitutional Court roots its
jurisprudence in the original intent or spirit of the constitutional
assembly, which sought to empower those previously left outside
the political process.
The Colombian Constitutional Court's interpretive approach
cannot be fully appreciated without reference to certain
fundamental constitutional principles that have guided the
Court's early work. An early opinion by Justice Ciro Angarita
Baron, writing for a tutela panel in 1992, illustrates the
importance of these principles to Court's interpretive approach.
Ruling on a public health and sewage claim, the opinion
banks and in files of public and private entities." CONST. POL. COL. art. 15. And Article
20 recognizes the social responsibility of the mass media and guarantees "the right to
corrections under equal conditions." CONST. COL. POL. art. 20. Article 6 provides that
"Individuals are responsible before the authorities for infringing the Constitution and
laws. Public servants are for the same reasons and for omissions or acting beyond their
limits in the exercise of their fimctions." CONST. POL. COL. art. 6.
Perhaps nowhere is awareness of the increasing significance of private power
(and the corresponding impotence of public authority) more heightened than in Colombia.
Writing in El Tiempo, Antanas Mockus recently described Colombia's "free market in
violence" as the "Colombian Sickness." Antanas Mockus, "La enfermedad colombiana, EL
TIEMPO (BogotA), Mar. 25, 1998. According to Mockus, in Colombia there is even "a
fragmentation and privatization of what in other societies is the last resort: the use of
force." Id. With a "gradual substitution of private justice for state justice or divine
justice," Colombia has 25,500 violent deaths a year instead of the 3,000 such deaths that
would be expected if it were no more violent than other countries as a whole. Id.
315. Sentencia No. T-696/n.d., as quoted in DESARROLLO JURISPRUDENCIAL DE LA
CONSTITUCION POLITICA, supra note 82, at 105.
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addresses several important issues concerning the nature of the
new Constitution, the role of the Court, and its interpretive
methodology, beginning with Article l's definition of Colombia as
an estado social de derecho-the first of Title I's fundamental
principles-and explaining it as combining the concepts of a
social welfare state with those of a democratic constitutional
state.
Justice Angarita describes the new constitution as
consecrating new values and rights, such as second and third
generational socio-economic and. communal rights, and creating
mechanisms such as participatory democracy,"'6 political and
judicial control of power, and a catalog of principles and
fundamental rights that inspire all interpretation and
functioning of the political organization. In turn, these changes
from a liberal state to a social state of law have changed the
judiciary's role not just quantitatively, by adding to the law, but
qualitatively as well, producing "a new manner of interpreting
the law." 317 Two principles have pushed the Court into
dispensing with tradition in favor of an active judicial role. First,
the Court does not see the law itself as a sacrosanct "emanation
of the popular will."318 Like the constitutional assembly, the
Constitutional Court seeks to defend fundamental rights, even if
those rights run counter to popular opinion. Secondly, the Court
is concerned with material justice.319
Obviously, this approach to law and the process of
constitutional interpretation raises separation of powers issues.
The Court seems willing to resolve these issues in favor of broad
judicial power, and the legislature, with its recent affirmation of
the tutela, seems to support this kind of judicial pressure. The
Court in the sewage case exercised power to declare means of
enforcing constitutional guarantees where the legislature had
316. For description of the constitution's mechanisms of participatory democracy,
including mandatory voting, recall of elected officials, the plebicite, the referendum,
popular participation in constitutional reform, popular consultation, the cabildo abierto (a
Spanish mechanism somewhat like the town meeting), legislative initiative, popularly
elected local and regional administrative boards, and mandatory education about the
constitution in public and private schools, see Rail Osorio Vargas, La participacien:
derecho al derecho, in CONSTrUCI6N 1991: CAJA DE HERRAMIENTAS (Mario Jurich Durdn
ed., 1992).
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failed to adopt implementing statutes .32 Acknowledging that
under the prior system fundamental rights were reduced to
having only symbolic force, the opinion characterizes the
Constitution as adopting a "new strategy" for making
fundamental rights effective by giving priority to judges, rather
than the administration or the legislature, for this responsibility.
"Today, with the new Constitution, these rights are those that
the justices say through the tutela decisions."32' The Court
refused to limit fundamental rights to those that are of
immediate application or to those listed as fundamental rights in
Chapter 1 of Title II of the Constitution. 2 Taking what it
termed an intermediate position on whether social, economic,
and cultural rights were judicially enforceable, it declared that,
in the absence of implementing legislation, tutela justices had the
authority to give immediate protection to fundamental rights to
the point of soliciting the intervention of the authorities
competent to provide services needed to put an end to the
violation. This resolution was deemed compatible with a
contemporary interpretation of separation of powers under which
a judge can become an instrument of pressure against the
legislature, in such a manner that if it does not want to see its
sphere of decision invaded by other organs, it will accept its
responsibilities for developing the law.... This counter-balance
of powers.. .is the best guarantee of the effective protection of
the rights of the members."'
In reaching its decision, the Court says that it will consider
both "the seriousness of the violation of the fundamental right in
light of the constitutional texts [and] the economic possibilities
for solving the problem."24
The opinion concluded that the right to public health
extended to the completion of construction of a sewage system, in
circumstances where fundamental constitutional principles and
rights such as human dignity, life, and the rights of the disabled
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. The opinion referred to the debates in the constitutional assembly to support




were threatened, and thus was susceptible of being protected
through a tutela.
The Court's early work reflects the thinking of German and
Spanish legal theorists. German philosopher Theodor Viehweg's
Topics and Law has been particularly influential, providing
support for an interpretive approach that is problem-oriented
and highly contextualized.323 As Justice Gaviria has written,
what Viehweg says to us is to forget the axiomatic character of
law, that the law does not have an axiomatic character, it has
a searching (or investigative, cetdtico) character, a
fundamentally problematical character, an open (aportdtico)
character. What one does is to search, to investigate which is
the principle that most clearly is going to satisfy the
necessities in the resolution of a particular case.326
And this means that no longer is the legislator seen as sovereign
and the judge as secondary, a mere vicarious applier of the
sovereign's norms. Rather, the judge is going to play the role of
the protagonist.
3 27
Justice Cifuentes has embraced a highly contextualized
interpretive methodology, which he describes as the
constitutionalism of poverty. He contends that the Court's
jurisprudence is based in the reality of the Colombian situation,
especially the country's poverty. He recognizes the constitutional
mandate of positive rights, but he also grounds the Court's role in
"social reality marked by inequality and social injustice."2 ' In
this Cifuentes distinguishes Latin American democracies from
older democracies as he argues that judicial activism is necessary
lest "the Constitution... be subsumed in lethargy and lose social
credibility."3" Cifuentes places the valor (value, force, validity) of
325. E.g., Interview with Catalina Botero, supra note 140; Conversation with
Alexander Springer, Bogotd, Colombia (Dec. 14, 1998). See generally THEODOR VIEHWEG,
TOPICS AND LAW (W. Cole Durham, Jr., trans., 1993). Viehweg, a law professor at Mainz,
and Chaim Perelman were leading figures in the 1950s European revival of interest in
Aristotelean rhetoric. Bernard E. Jacobs, Book Review: Ancient Rhetoric, Modern Legal
Thought, and Politics: A Review Essay on the Translation of Viehweg's 'Topics and Law,"
89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1622 (1995).
326. Carlos Gaviria Diaz, La interpretaci6n constitucional, in NUEVAS CORRIENTES
DEL DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL COLOMBIANO, supra note 7, at 121, 133.
327. Id.
328. See Cifuentes, supra note 7, at 126, 127.
329. Id.
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the Constitution in the hands of the judiciary, and identifies the
judicial activism as "a reflection of a progressive Constitution
and of a reality characterized by poverty."
3 3 0
B. Originalism and Culture Wars
Turning back to the Constitutional Court's gender decisions,
we have seen that they are an important part of the overall
equality struggle in Colombia today. The justices on this new
Court view it as part of their role to be leaders in the society's on-
going battles over respect for human rights, with a special
responsibility for protecting the rights of those who have been
unable to gain such respect through the ordinary political
processes. Indeed, except with regard to abortion and some
matters of sexual orientation, they generally have used the
constitution as a weapon against traditionalism, interpreting it
to defy longstanding social views, not just on gender and sexual
orientation, but also on other controversial topics such as the
right to use drugs,"' and the right to die."2
330. Id. See also Eduardo Cifuentes Mufioz, Derechos fundamentales e interpretaci6n
constiucional, in NUEVAS CORRIENTES DEL DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL COLOMBIANO,
supra note 7, at 7. Other justices on the Constitutional Court, even the more conservative
ones such as Jos6 Gregorio Hern.ndez also express positive views on the activist role of
the Court. Interview with Jos6 Gregorio Hernindez, supra note 160; interview with
Antonio Barrera Carbonell, supra note 142.
331. See Sentencia No. C-221/94 (ruling that the penal code's criminalization of the
possession and use of small amounts of marijuana or cocaine violates the right to freely
develop one's personality).
332. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in rejecting arguments for a federal
constitutional right to die in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 718, n.16 (1997), the
Colombian Constitutional Court had recently accepted similar arguments under the
Colombian Constitution. The previous month, the Colombian justices had ruled by a vote
of six to three in favor of a constitutional right to doctor-assisted euthanasia for the
terminally ill, invalidating Article 326 of the Penal Code's treatment of such euthanasia
as homicide punishable by six months to three years imprisonment. Justice Carlos
Gaviria Diaz wrote the May 20th opinion for the Court, Sentencia No. C-239/97. See
Fallos humanos: un aval para el derecho a morir, EL TIEMPO (Bogotd), Dec. 27, 1997. See
also Serge F. Kovaleski, Colombian High Court Legalizes Mercy Killing: Vatican Assails
Assisted Suicide Decision, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 24, 1997, at 28A, cited in CRUMP,
GRESsuAN, & DAY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 563-64 (1998): "In
announcing the decision, the court's president explained, The State has the duty to
protect life, but this duty is not absolute-it has a limit. There is not just one morality.
Every person can determine their own sense of life, whether it is sacred or not.'" Id.
A superficial reading of the Constitutional Court's jurisprudence may lead to an
exaggerated view of the degree to which the Court's opinions, outside the ambit of
abortion, conflict with teachings of the Catholic Church. However, much of the Court's
jurisprudence is fairly consistent with liberal strains of Catholic social teachings. Indeed,
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Looking to the U.S. Constitution for a comparative
perspective, after more than 200 years, the proper balance
between judicial review and deference to the ordinary political
processes and the role that tradition should play in U.S.
constitutional interpretation (and how and when it should be
determined) continue to be hotly debated. "' In recent gender
discrimination decisions, Justice Antonin Scalia derides the
majority for taking sides and imposing constitutional standards
in what he sees as mere cultural debates that should be left to
the political processes. In his dissenting opinion in U.S. v.
Virginia (VMI), he decries the Court's disregard of tradition and
claims that the democratic system is destroyed "if the smug
assurances of each age are removed from the democratic process
and written into the Constitution." 4
Reiterating his "originalist" view that "when a practice not
expressly prohibited by the text of the Bill of Rights bears the
endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread, and
unchallenged use that dates back to the beginning of the
Republic, we have no proper basis for striking it down," he
characterizes the majority's willingness to depart from society's
traditions as the guide to constitutional interpretation as "not
law, but politics-smuggled-into-law."3  If the U.S. Supreme
Court as a whole has yet to embrace Scalian hermeneutics over
more traditional views of the constitution as a living document to
Justice Cifuentes' explication of "the constitutionalism of poverty," Cifunetes, supra note
7, bears striking similarities to liberation theology's "the option for the poor."
333. In January 1998, the Constitutional Law Section of the American Association of
Law Schools devoted its program at the annual AALS meeting to Justice Scalia's attack
on the role the federal judiciary has played in what he terms our society's "culture wars"
and to his accompanying charge in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), (in which the
majority invalidated a Colorado state constitutional amendment that discriminated
against gays, lesbians, and bisexuals) that modem constitutional interpretations
represent only the "dogma of the educated elite." "Constitutional Law: Dogma of the
Educated Elite?," Section Program of the Constitutional Law Section, 1998 Annual
Meeting of the American Association of Law Schools, Jan. 9, 1998, San Francisco, Cal.
334. U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In an earlier
dissent in J.E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB., 511 U.S. 127, 160 (1994), he attacked the
majority's opinion holding that gender-based peremptory challenges to jurors violate
equal protection, saying that "the Court's legal reasoning in this case is largely obscured
by anti-male-chauvinist oratory." "Today's opinion is an inspiring demonstration of how
thoroughly up-to-date and right-thinking we Justices are in matters pertaining to the
sexes (or as the Court would have it, the genders), and how sternly we disapprove the
male chauvinist attitudes of our predecessors." Id. at 156.
335. U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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be interpreted in light of our evolving values and traditions,
the normative comfort margin may be tightening."7
When asked about the role of the court in what some might
term "culture wars," Justice Cifuentes considered it very difficult
for a Constitutional Court to separate itself from the society's
problems and cultural conflicts.3 In his view, the court should
not close cultural discussion but it must ensure that the dialogue
takes place within a framework that respects constitutional
values. He stated that the Colombian Court's function today is
very different from the role the U.S. Supreme Court can play
because "public opinion in the United States is more evolved, is
more accustomed to the values of liberty and equality, it is a
public opinion that even can be much more evolved than the
Supreme Court of Justice itself in some cases." In contrast, in
Colombia, "the lack of an informed public opinion has obligated
the Constitutional Court to fill a vacuum, in a certain sense. "'39
He stressed that the Constitutional Court must be aware that its
role is situational and temporal; "it is not trying to close the
possibilities that the same society question itself and resolve its
problems. And thus, the Court's decisions have to stimulate this
public discussion, this public debate, without substituting for
it.
340
Despite this judicial activism, the Constitutional Court does
view constitutional intent and purpose as relevant to its
interpretive task. The Court at times refers to the intentions or
purposes of the Constituent Assembly to support its decisions, as
in this example from the opinion prohibiting denial of admission
to military institutions based on sexual orientation:
336. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992), Joint Opinion of JJ. O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter:
Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer bounds of the
substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects. See
U.S. CONST. amdt. IX...
The inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process claims
may call upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise that same
capacity which by tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment.
Id. at 848, 849.
337. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (finding no fundamental
right to physician-assisted suicide in the nation's history, traditions, and practices).




The constitutional assembly wanted to raise to the status of
fundamental rights the liberty related to vital choices and
individual beliefs, and thus emphasized the liberal principle of
no institutional interference in subjective matters that do not
constitute attempts against social coexistence and
organization.34'
As this quotation illustrates, the Court's activism itself can
be defended as an originalist position if one accepts that the
constitutional assembly intended the Court to play a
transformative role in developing the new Constitution, and
particularly its fundamental principles of a "social state of law,"
"coexistence," and "participatory democracy." According to Dean
Cepeda, the Constitutional Court has reinterpreted the
traditional function that judicial actions to enforce constitutional
rights play in representative democracies in light of the new
Constitution's commitment to participatory democracy: "Now
[silent majorities] speak with a strong voice in what might be
called a strategic alliance of the powerless with the judges to
protect fundamental constitutional rights.""2 Cepeda concludes
that the Court's decisions "reveal a philosophy that goes beyond
the debate between new left and new right. They have preserved
the original consensus that informed the Constitution. The
Court has generally been on the side of those without access to
power in the political process, reflecting the spirit of the
Constitution."343
In short, the Constitution and the members of the Colombian
Court reject the formalistic proposition, implicit in Justice
Scalia's criticisms, that law is something entirely separate and
apart from politics, and that the distribution and redistribution
of power is never to be the explicit subject of judicial opinions.
This reduces if not alleviates concerns about "smuggling" politics
into constitutional interpretation.
341. Sentencia No. T-097/94. More complex questions about the "intent" of the
framers are raised by issues that the constituent assembly considered and rejected or
failed to include in the final draft of the constitution. For example, both abortion and the
right to die fall in this category. Dean Cepeda argues in his La constituci6n que no fue
(The Constitution That Wasn't) that Article 94's recognition of unenumerated rights may
be looked to as textual warrant for providing protection in some such cases. CEPEDA,
supra note 79, at 27-28.
342. Cepeda, supra note 6, at 76.
343. Id. at 91.
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Something more than the Colombian Court's confidence in
its ability to divine and apply societal traditions at the time the
Constitution was adopted is at play here. The Colombian judges
are convinced that their Constitution must be read not as merely
enshrining the values of their society in 1991 but as affording
protective shelter to fundamental human rights that have yet to
be fully accepted or embraced by the majority of the society. In
his separate opinion in the 1997 abortion case, Justice Cifuentes,
joined by two other members of the Court, emphasized that
"there are matters and subjects which, like the one under
analysis, pertain to the private and moral sphere of the person
and whose definition is outside the democratic processes.""
While the majority disagreed as to a constitutionally protected
right to abortion, in other areas the court has refused to rely on
the political processes to protect minority rights. Justice
Cifuentes explained how his Court views its role:
[Tihis is a role that the Constitutional Court has assumed
because it is aware that the function of a constitutional court
is not only to restrain and to reiterate the rights of powerful
groups but, without engaging in populism or demagoguery,
really the function of a constitutional court is to assume in the
social and political arena, the defense of those groups that
actually have been at the margin of the institutions, at the
margin of social development and economic development, and
this is the case, naturally, with women. Women,
homosexuals, low income workers, children, in the end all
these groups of persons are the groups that have been most
advantaged by the decisions of the Constitutional Court.
Because the Constitutional Court is aware that through the
institutional mechanisms of political representation, the
demands of these groups are not duly articulated, so that it is
the Constitutional Court, at least with respect to the judicial
system, that has to take responsibility for helping these
345groups in a much more direct and decided manner....
In this sense, the Colombian Constitutional Court's actions
present a modified example of the type of transformative role
Ruti Teitel understands the transitional judiciary to play in
periods of political transformation. In contrast with ordinary
344. Salvamento de voto a la Sentencia No. C-013/97.
345. Interview with Eduardo Cifuentes Mufioz (Dec. 11, 1998), supra note 107.
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
periods where the counter-majoritarian problem is a real issue,
transitional times may well call for activist adjudication that can
insure rights and thus establish and strengthen the legitimacy of
the nascent democracy.346 According to Teitel, though the U.S.
transition was not as dramatic as that in many contemporary
transitional societies, the federal constitution itself may be better
understood through the supplemental lens of transitional
constitutionalism.347 She suggests the implications of such a
perspective for constitutional interpretation:
A transitional perspective contributes a unique view to the
debates over the ongoing relevance of "original intent" to the
contemporary significance of relevant constitutional
provisions. The transitional perspective shares with the
"fidelity" school of interpretation the understanding that
constitutions are best examined in light of historical and
political contexts, but it adds to the understanding of




In short, the justices of the Colombian Constitutional Court
readily admit to charges of judicial activism. They generally
describe their interpretive philosophy as "systematic," combining
the use of text, context, history, and other interpretive aids,
rather than using what we refer to in the United States as an
"originalist" approach. 9 In Colombia, Justice Cifuentes noted,
the debate over "originalism" versus a "living constitution" really
does not exist as it is presented in the United States." He
explained that for the Colombian Court, the intent of the
constitutional assembly is a secondary criteria; it is more
important to interpret the constitution as an "instrument of
convivencia (coexistence)" that "offers solutions for each
generation and thus is not anchored to a vision of the past."35'
Justice Martnez echoed this view, saying that a constitutional
justice "has to interpret for the time and the era in which he is
called upon to interpret the norm" and that "one does not
346. Teitel, supra note 19, at 2032-34.
347. Id. at 2070-75.
348. Id. at 2074-75 (citations omitted).
349. E.g., Interview with Antonio Barrera Carbonell, supra note 142; Interview with
Eduardo Cifuentes Mufioz (Dec. 11, 1998), supra note 107.
350. Interview with Eduardo Cifuentes Mufioz (Dec. 11, 1998), supra note 107.
351. Id.
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interpret a norm for the past but for the present." "' An open
norm like the Colombian norm of conviviencia, he acknowledged,
"by its own structure, allows the ideology of the judge to become
involved."
C. The Future of Colombian Gender
Jurisprudence: More Than Just Words?
Given the Colombian Constitutional Court's willingness to
interpret the country's new constitution as a tool for changing
cultural values, its evolving gender jurisprudence may provide
insights on the fundamental question of whether constitutions
are up to the task. As Joel Bakan queries, can a constitution be
more than "just words"? ... The question merits further study
and must await future developments but some observations are
possible.
The Colombian Constitution's creation of a new and
independent Constitutional Court to oversee the protection of the
fundamental rights it recognizes and its provision of expedited
procedures for their protection gives reason for optimism.
Establishing this new tribunal has led to friction with the
preexisting judicial bodies but it also has allowed the
Constitutional Court to take a fresh start and interpret the new
charter free of backlogs or corruption that beset other parts of the
judicial system. Although analysis of other courts is beyond the
scope of this article,"' South Africa's recent experience with its
new Constitutional Court 5  lends further support to the thesis
352. Interview with Alejandro Martnez, supra note 260.
353. See also BAKAN, supra note 41. In this recent study of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, Bakan is doubtful about the transformative power of constitutional
law. With respect to the Canadian Charter, much of his pessimism is based on its failure
to, as he puts it, take private power seriously. Id. For discussion of whether the Bill of
Rights of the 1996 South African Constitution has any "horizontal" effects on private
companies or individuals, see Dickson, supra note 42, at 548-49. See generally ANDREW
CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE (1993). If concern about the extent to
which private centers of power are beyond the reach of constitutional law were the only
reason for doubt about the role constitutions can play in social change, there would be
more room for optimism under the Colombian Constitution. See supra text accompanying
notes 41-42.
354. For a summary of the history of constitutional courts, generally and in Latin
America, and for a comparative table of the rules governing their composition, see JAVIER
TOBo RODRIGUEZ, LA CORTE CONSTUTUcIONAL Y EL CONTROL DE CONSTITUCIONALIDAD EN
COLOMBIA 35-36, 106-114 (1999).
355. See Dickson, supra, note 42, at 548-49. On the new Constiutional Court and its
335
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that a separate and independent constitutional court that takes
its task seriously can be key to the success of transformative
constitutional law. The role of new Constitutional Courts in
other parts of Latin America and in the transitional societies of
Central and Eastern Europe are providing further evidence for
examining this thesis.""
Colombian jurists and activists I interviewed generally see
the early experiences under the new Constitution as evidence
that constitutions can be more than paper. Justice Cifuentes
admits that one of the greatest risks of Latin American
constitutions is that they proclaim rights that are very generous
but are not complied with or enforced in reality. He emphasizes
that the new Colombian Constitution directly addresses the
divorce between law and reality that has existed in Latin
America since the days of the colonial conquest, reflected in a
saying popular throughout the region, "se obedece pero no se
cumple" (we obey but we do not comply with or follow). He views
the tutela as one of the mechanisms designed precisely to
immunize the Constitution against this "virus." And the Social
State of Law in not simply a State of Law but imposes an
obligation on the political powers to provide the material
conditions so that these rights can be a reality. Thus the
effectiveness of rights has been made a theme of the positive
constitutional law itself. The Court's activism is an attempt to
avoid the great risk that the nominal constitution not be a real
constitution, which he sees as the challenge facing his and future
courts. 5 7
Justice Martinez expressed his belief that when a
constitution has mechanisms like the action of
unconstitutionality and the tutela, it is capable of doing things
not just on paper but in reality. He believes that the Court's
jurisprudence has opened society's eyes. The big change in
judicial perspective has been to make a pedagogy of its
early interpretive approach, see Patric Mtshaulana & Melanie Thomas, The
Constitutional Court of South Africa: An Introduction, 3 REv. OF CONST. STUD. 98 (1996);
Hugh Corder & Dennis Davis, A Ringing and Decisive Break with the Past?, 3 REv. OF
CONST. STUD. 141 (1996).
356. See Teitel, supra note 19. On women and the transitional societies of Central
and Eastern Europe generally, see WOMEN AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 19; Frances
Elisabeth Olsen, Feminism in Central and Eastern Europe: Risks and Possibilities of
American Engagement, 106 YALE L.J. 2215 (1997).
357. Interview with Eduardo Cifuentes Mufioz (Dec. 11, 1998), supra note 107.
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constitutional thinking. Its activism has not been limited to
placing in its opinions what is really happening in society but
extends to explaining why it has done so. He explains that the
Court has had to play a more activist role than they would have
otherwise wanted because of the reality that someone had to give
the society a beacon to walk toward and the parties and Congress
had failed to do so. He also emphasizes that the Court's activist
role in applying the 1991 Constitution is linked to providing
solutions to the reality of the society's violence. He describes the
Court as breaking a series of taboos that were factors that have
generated violence in society."8
Without doubt the Constitution has had an impact on the
real life of the people, according to Dean Cepeda. His certainty is
based both on what people have told him about how their lives
have been changed because they won-or lost-a tutela action,
and on instances where he has been involved in decision-making
in the university or the government when someone has said,
"let's not do that because a tutela will be filed against us." The
very idea of the Constitution was that it should no longer be-
shall we say-a theology but should become an instrument of
social change, he explains. What the tutela tried to do was to
redistribute social power; rights are defined as powers; rights are
powers. The tutela is the manner of making such power effective
and in this sense, it is redistributing power in the society.359
Maria Cristina Calder6n echoed the view that people have
come to think of rights as power. Before, the people did not
believe in justice of the laws. Before, the State was the axis; the
tutela has changed the rules of the game. Now the rights of the
individual are first; before the State was first. 60
Of course, over-reliance on courts to protect human rights
has its familiar dangers. One is that as courts and judges change
so may their jurisprudence. Recent reports on the Colombian
Constitutional Court give cause for concern about the future of
the Court and thus of its jurisprudence supporting women's
human rights. Seven of the nine current justices are serving
eight-year terms that expire in 2001. The consensus among
those interviewed was that the constitutional assembly made a
358. Interview with Alejandro Martinez, supra note 260.
359. Interview with Manuel Jos6 Cepeda, supra note 81.
360. Interview with Maria Cristina Calder6n, supra note 2.
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mistake by failing to provide for staggered terms. Among the
uncertainties were how many of the justices would serve their
full terms and whether the Senate again would select the new
justices as a package by consensus."'
The justices I questioned expressed their optimism that the
court's jurisprudence on gender and other human rights would
ensure, noting that public acceptance of the tutela should help
ensure continuity in this regard. But others worried that even if
the new justices want to remain faithful to the current court's
jurisprudence, their task will be difficult given the enormous
number of decisions it has issued and the paucity of material
analyzing the decisions. And because most tutelas are decided by
one of nine different panels of three justices, conflicts can exist; it
is difficult for even the current justices to stay abreast of all the
decisions.362
Judicial activism of the type the Colombian Constitutional
Court has engaged in also invites backlash.6 3 So far attacks on
the Court and proposals to "rein in" or restrict it have failed. But
renewed attempts to discredit the Court may at least partially
explain claims that the Court has become polarized and
politicized. Since 1997, a 5-4 division on the Court has been
reported.364 Initially, the split was linked to events surrounding
the release of the decision in the May 1997 "right to die" case.365
361. When Justice Arango resigned in April 1998, the President sent the Senate the
names of three candidates; the appointee selected was Justice Alfredo Beltrdn, formerly a
Supreme Court Justice. In February 1999, Justice Hernando Herrera resigned and was
replaced by Justice Alvaro Tafur Galvis.
362. E.g., Interview with Manuel Josd Cepeda, supra note 81; Interview with Rodrigo
Uprinmy, supra note 108.
363. For example, Nagle has criticized the Court's May 5, 1994, decision on personal
drug use (the "Just Say Yes" decision) as "poorly arrived at.. through uninformed
libertarian activism" and details how it provoked extremely negative and potentially
dangerous reactions against the new Constitutional Court by the executive and legislative
branches. However, she concludes that in this case, the Court's decision ultimately led to
the other branches' acknowledgment of the autonomy of the Court and thus may have
strengthened the independence of the judiciary. Nagle, supra note 5, at 85-90.
364. See El 5-4 de la Corte Constitucional, EL TIEMPO (Bogot4), Aug. 11, 1997, at 3A,
cited in Magistrados de la Corte radicalizan divisi6n, EL TIEMPO (Bogotd), Sept. 30, 1998.
365. John Gutiorrez, Pugna constitucional, EL TIEMPO (BogotA), Sept. 30, 1998
(reporting that the division began May 20, 1997 when Justice Cifuentes resigned as Vice-
president of the Court because of changes he claimed that had been made to part of the
opinion in the "right to die" case, causing Justice Gaviria, who had written the opinion, to
return from a trip to Switzerland to respond to Cifuentes' accusations). Note also
Interview with Eduardo Cifuentes Mufioz (Dec. 11, 1998), supra note 107; Interview with
Manuel Jos6 Cepeda, supra note 81.
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Beginning in late September 1998, reports of increasing
politicization and polarization on the Court were almost daily
fare in the country's media."' Justice Antonio Barrera Carbonell
was moved to publicly defend the Court's independence and to
deny the existence of internal conflicts:
[To say that the Court is politicized] is disrespectful of the
Court because it has demonstrated that it is an independent
Court, precisely in the manner in which it has made its
decisions without taking into account the opinions of some
who could consider them catastrophic. The Court has made
the decision that corresponds to the law and has not yielded to
the pressures of any class.
Absolutely nothing is happening in the Court, the same
harmony reins as always. In the Court, there are ideological
debates as in all institutions that handle matters of national
importance, but there is no internal problem here, there are
not internal conflicts.
The truth shows that the Court has developed a rigorously
juridical body of work and the proof of this is the prestige,
both national and international, that the body has.367
The cases provoking these recent reports dealt with highly
politicized issues related to the retroactivity of extradition
legislation and legislators' immunity for their roles in acquitting
former President Samper of charges of accepting campaign
money from drug cartels.6 ' But damage to the Court's credibility
and prestige could have much broader effects. These criticisms of
the Court are especially troublesome because they were aired at
a time when proposals for reforming the 1991 Constitution were
366. See, e.g., iCambiar el congreso o reformar las Cortes? EL TIEMIPO (Bogot6) Sept.
30, 1998; AQud pasa en la Corte?, EL TIEMPO (Bogoti), Oct. 1, 1998.
367. "Somos una Corte independiente," EL TIEMPO (Bogotd), Oct. 5, 1998.
368. See, e.g., Luis Carlos G6mez, Dos caras de la extradici6n en la Corte, EL TIEMPO
(Bogot), Oct. 4, 1998 (interviewing Justice Vladimiro Naranjo, President of the Court
and one of the four dissenting justices in the extradition case, and Carlos Gaviria Dfaz,
author of the majority opinion, who points out that other cases repudiate the rumored




under consideration. 69 In the beginning the reform proposals
primarily focused on Congress-with El Tiempo running a poll on
whether the Congress should be replaced.3 7 But attention turned
as well to reform of the judiciary, "' with judges of the Supreme
Court and Council of State calling for "a thorough reform of the
judiciary that is not just cosmetic."7 2 However, in December
1998, the Constitutional Court justices I questioned about this
did not believe any eventual reforms would affect the tutela or
the work of the Constitutional Court.
Even assuming that the Constitutional Court continues to be
willing and able to take gender rights seriously, questions remain
about the extent to which law can bring about change in people's
real lives. Justice Cifuentes' opinion in the case on homosexuality
in the military acknowledged the difficulties.
It should be noted that if on this topic the law has played an
essential role in transforming societal beliefs, these still are
found lagging behind in relation to the normative ideals. The
values of tolerance and pluralism, fully adopted by judicial
ordinance, must still overcome enormous obstacles in order to
be fully assured in daily life.
3 73
While the early years under the new constitution have
proven to many Colombians that a constitution can be more than
words, Justice Cifuentes cautions against over-estimating the
capacity of the courts to produce rapid social change.
[The judiciary] is simply one stage, among many settings,
where women have to act. ... It seems positive to me that
369. See, e.g., Juan Lozano, Extraha reforma, EL TIEMPO (Bogotd), Sept. 28, 1998.
370. As of October 6, 1998, 69.3% of the 9,384 votes cast agreed that the current
Congress should be closed and new congresspersons elected. EL TIEMPO (Bogot), Oct. 6,
1998.
371. /Cambiar el Congreso o reformar las Cortes?, supra note 366.
372. See Palo de las cortes a proyecto de reforma, EL TIEMPO (Bogot.), Oct. 15, 1998.
Justice Jose Fernando Ramirez, President of the Supreme Court, argued that merely
changing the manner of selecting justices was not sufficient: "A true constitutional reform
must address the solution of serious problems like court congestion, access to justice, and
impunity in criminal matters." Id. The President of the Council of State, Judge Dolly
Pedraza, reportedly referred to the tutela and the accusatory system as the type of
constitutional issues that merit urgent consideration. Id. (The new Constitution replaced
Colombia's traditional inquisitorial system of criminal justice with an accusatorial
system. See Cepeda, supra note 6, at 85).
373. Sentencia No. T-097/94.
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they are trying to stimulate a more active and forceful
participation by women in the political world, not only in the
judicial world. Judicial decisions are little triumphs. But it
seems to me that the political struggle could yield larger
dividends for women because the process of validation and
equality could be had in less social time. Victories through
jurisprudence are slow victories. 74
Similarly, former Justice Arango reflected on the important
but limited role that law can play in bringing about social
change.
Article 13 of the Constitution refers to equality and says that
equality is real, does it not? And it absolutely prohibits all
discrimination based on race, sex, religion, national origin,
political convictions, etc. There can be no [such]
discrimination for any purpose. To the contrary, the state
must protect the weakest so that the equality will be real....
And the jurisprudence of the lower courts and the appellate
courts and this court has been applying these principles ....
Naturally, this is not a process of one day or of one year, it is a
slow process. Because I do not believe that a society can be
changed through laws as much as through education.
Changing the way people live, what people think, reeducating
the people is more than making laws. If you were to change
people through laws, it would be very difficult. Because
nothing is easier than making a law, and nothing is more
difficult than enforcing it.
375
VI. CONCLUSION
It is too early to fully assess how effective the new
Colombian Constitutional Court will be in its mission, as
described by Justice Carlos Gaviria, "to make sure that people's
fundamental rights do not just stay on paper." But Colombian
women's rights advocates are taking machismo to court on a wide
range of charges and they generally are finding a surprisingly
receptive Constitutional Court. This experience is one that
merits further observation by those of us who remain optimistic,
if not convinced, that constitutional law can play a
374. Interview with Eduardo Cifuentes Mufioz (July 5, 1995), supra note 38.
375. Interview with Jorge Arango Mejia, supra note 94.
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transformative role in creating a culture of respect for
fundamental human rights.
